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1. Introduction 
Short sellers play an important role in preventing overpricing and creating price bubbles in 
financial markets. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) argue that the high cost of short selling and 
the resulting absence of liquidity-motivated short selling make short sellers more informed than 
the average traders.
1
 For instance, Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008) show that the trading 
activity of short sellers can predict future stock returns. Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg 
(2012) report that the information advantage of short sellers partly arises because they are better 
than other market participants at processing public information. Both articles, among many 
others, show that informed short selling is prevalent by documenting that high volume of short 
selling predicts future negative returns.  
These studies are based on U.S. data, mostly due to data availability, but also because high 
levels of liquidity and pricing efficiency make the U.S. markets attractive to both traders and 
researchers. In the U.S. stock markets, short sellers can easily borrow shares and open or close 
positions at low costs. Moreover, the relatively low market volatility lowers the costs of arbitrage, 
and the costs and risks of short selling. Thus, in the U.S., profitable arbitrage opportunities such 
as short selling can make prices more efficient (see Boehmer and Wu, 2013). 
Unfortunately, these U.S.-based results are not easily generalizable internationally. In many 
countries, short sales may be prohibited; or stock borrowing and lending may be illegal, 
restricted, or undesirable; and short sellers may face high volatility. These factors make trading 
costly and potentially lower the profit from short sales, making arbitrage less attractive for short 
sellers. In some extreme cases, the very high cost of shorting might eliminate shorting activities 
completely, even if short sellers have private information. Moreover, short sellers may find it 
                                                          
1
 This claim is supported by the theoretical models proposed by Miller (1977) and Hong and Stein (2003) and by 
empirical evidence provided by Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and Balachandran (2002), Asquith, Pathak, and 
Ritter (2005), and Boehmer, Huszár, and Jordan (2010). 
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difficult to obtain private information in these markets and, therefore, such foreign markets may 
not experience the benefits of short selling. This suggests that short selling and relevant 
regulations play a more significant role in some markets than in others. In particular, this cross-
country variation raises the important question of what factors determine the costs and benefits 
of short selling.  
We bridge this gap in the literature and provide a characterization of these factors. We 
conduct a comprehensive multi-country analysis that takes into account the 2008 financial crisis, 
country-level variations in regulations, local market quality, and the degree and intensity of 
market development. As the channels that deliver information from short sellers and facilitate the 
pricing efficiency may differ across countries, we use a comprehensive set of 11 different 
variables to capture short-sale activity that we adopt from the previous literature. These variables 
include share loans outstanding scaled by shares outstanding or by trading volume (i.e., short 
interest ratio and days-to-cover ratio), shorting costs as captured by lending fees, loan supply, 
utilization rates in the stock lending market, and measures of demand and supply shocks in the 
stock lending market as constructed in Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007). We categorize these 
variables into trade-based, fee-based, and supply/demand-based measures to capture different 
aspects of the state of shorting market and to link the state of the shorting market with return 
predictability in a global setting.  
Moreover, we highlight and explain country-specific variation in short-sale predictive power 
for future stock returns, which provides important new insights about the determinants of short-
sales’ predictive power. Our study covers 38 countries, which exhibit substantial variation in 
short-sale regulations, market quality, and financial market development. Our sample covers the 
period 2006–2014. During this period, we witness many short-sale related regulatory changes 
before, during, and after the 2008 global financial crisis. The breadth and depth of our data allow 
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us to gain a deep understanding of the interaction between the cost and reward of short selling 
and facilitate an analysis of how specific market forces and conditions affect the informativeness 
of short selling.  
Our empirical study has two parts. First, we examine the return predictability of 11 different 
shorting measures in our pooled sample. We find that most of the shorting measures can predict 
returns over horizons ranging from 5–60 days, with the days-to-cover ratio and loan supply 
having the most robust predictive power. These results suggest that short sellers in our sampled 
countries are, on average, informed about the future stock returns in the global capital market. 
However, not all of the measures provide consistent insights. For example, the short interest ratio 
can significantly predict negative raw returns. But the coefficient of the short interest ratio is 
significant in the wrong direction when we use the Hou, Karolyi, and Kho (2011) factor pricing 
model to adjust for risk in returns. This finding echoes Hong et al. (2016)’s recommendation to 
standardize short-sale trades by shares traded rather than by shares outstanding. This finding is 
important in itself because standardizing short-sale volume by shares outstanding remains a 
popular measure of short sellers’ information. 
In the second part of our study, we focus on the cross-country differences in the predictive 
power of short sales. We start by demonstrating the large variations in the informativeness of 
short sales in different countries and subsequently examine the specific factors that may 
contribute to the cross-country differences. Our hypothesis is that the nature and informativeness 
of short sales depends on the short-sale regulations (such as the uptick rules, short-sale bans, and 
the presence of effective security lending markets), market quality (such as liquidity and 
transaction costs), and market development (such as country-level openness or GDP per capita). 
With 38 countries in our sample, we observe substantial variations in regulations, market quality, 
and market development. The empirical results provide rich implications about the cross-country 
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differences in various dimensions of shorting activity. For the sake of brevity, in summarizing 
our results we focus on the discussion of the cross-country differences of two measures, the 
days-to-cover ratio and the loan supply because these measures have the most robust return 
predictability.  
Weak regulations such as uptick rules and naked short-sale bans significantly improve the 
predictive power of the day-to-cover ratio, but reduce the predictive power of the loan supply. 
Meanwhile, the presence of a central counterparty (CCP) for stock lending and borrowing does 
not enhance the return predictability of either measure. How do we interpret the mixed results 
regarding the roles of regulations? As modeled in Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), short sellers 
are rational investors. Short sale activity results from two interacting forces—the costs of short 
selling, which depends on the severity of the short-sale constraints, and the rewards of short 
selling, which depends on the information advantage of short sellers over other investors. The 
less informed traders are forced out of the market when mild regulation (such as the uptick rules 
and naked short-sale ban) increases the cost of short selling. The attendant decline in uninformed 
short selling increases the predictive power of short activities as measured by day-to-cover ratio. 
Meanwhile, the decline in uninformed short selling makes it more costly for the supply side to 
provide lendable shares, and therefore it reduces the predictive power of shorting supply.  
We expect the higher market quality and market development to enhance the return 
predictability of short selling. Greater liquidity, lower transaction costs, and better market 
development reduce the costs of arbitrage and thus facilitate information acquisition and 
arbitrage trading, which make prices more informationally efficient. We found that the predictive 
power of the day-to-cover ratio and the loan supply measures significantly improves in countries 
with greater market quality and high market development, suggesting a link between predictive 
power of shorting activity and the costs of short selling.  
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Our study is related to the burgeoning literature on short-sale bans (see Beber and Pagano, 
2013; Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2013) and the functioning of the stock lending markets 
(Cohen et al. 2007; Kolasinski, Reed, and Ringgenberg, 2013). These studies show that outright 
short-sale bans are associated with significant declines in market quality and large welfare losses 
and restrictions or inefficiencies in the stock lending market may delay the incorporation of 
private information. In addition to regulations, market characteristics and the degree of market 
development can also affect the costs of short selling. For example, Easley, O’Hara, and Yang 
(2014) show that informed traders want to protect their trade secrets, and hence market 
transparency may discourage them from trading. Our results also help to disentangle the subtle 
relation between market characteristics and informed trading activities. 
 Our contribution is twofold. First, we show that, on an average, short selling predicts returns 
in the global capital market. We categorize various shorting measures into trade-based, cost-
based, and demand/supply-based measures. We find that most of these measures can predict 
future stock returns, especially the day-to-cover ratio and the loan supply variables. However, 
this finding leaves much unexplained variation in the return predictability across countries. Our 
second contribution is that we address this variation explicitly and discuss implications for short-
sale regulations. We also provide insights about possible channels that link short sellers and 
future returns and show that each shorting variable plays a different role in predicting future 
returns, depending on the degree of regulation, market quality, and market development. 
Understanding the direction of these effects can aid regulators, traders, and researchers when 
considering new restrictions or interventions in the market.  
The rest of this paper is organized follows. Section 2 introduces the data, short-sale measures, 
and returns and control variables. We discuss the overall return predictability of short selling in 
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Section 3 and investigate the cross-country differences and potential channels in Section 4. 
Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Data and Summary Statistics 
2.1 Raw data 
We obtain stock-level data from 38 countries, including 23 developed and 15 emerging 
markets. Our daily sample starts on July 3, 2006, and ends on December 31, 2014. The short-sale 
data, including a comprehensive set of stock lending market and shorting measures, are from 
Markit Securities.
2
 For the U.S., we collect stock-level trading and accounting information from 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat. For other countries, we 
collect the relevant data from Datastream. We match the data from Datastream, CRSP, 
Compustat, and Markit using both International Securities Identification Number (ISIN) and 
stock exchange daily official list (SEDOL) or either of the two, and are able to match 51.30% of 
the data in Markit to other datasets.
3
 We follow the standard data cleaning procedures and 
impose the filters proposed by Griffin, Kelly, and Nardari (2010). The details of this process are 
discussed in Appendix A.  
We present the data coverage and summary statistics in Table 1 Panel A. For each country, 
we report the total market capitalization of the stocks covered in the final sample, the market cap 
percentage of the merged final sample of the Datastream/CRSP country-level coverage, and the 
number of firms and days for each country in our sample. Table 1 first displays the 23 developed 
                                                          
2
 Following Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011), we extract all firm-day observations from Markit securities finance data 
with record type=1, thereby indicating that the record combines different contracts with different dividend sharing 
agreements. This method allows us to consider all outstanding stock lending contracts for each stock, regardless of 
the type of collateral used or the term of the loans. 
3
 It is significantly below 100% because Markit includes many non-common equity issuances. 
7 
 
countries in alphabetical order (from Australia to the U.S.), followed by 15 emerging market 
countries in alphabetical order (from Brazil to Turkey).  
[Table 1 about here] 
To ensure that our global sample has adequate data coverage, we compare our data coverage 
with that of Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011), who use Markit data for the period January 2005 to 
December 2008. Our sample covers 13 more countries (Ireland, Brazil, Chile, China, Greece, 
Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Taiwan, and Turkey) and six 
more years (2009–2014), compared to Saffi and Sigurdsson’s (2011) sample. Taking one year 
for example, for 2008, Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011) report a total market cap of $27.097 trillion 
based on their sample of firms. For the same year, the total market cap of the same set of 
countries in our sample is $31.442 trillion. In terms of the overall market coverage, our Markit-
Datastream merge sample covered more than 80% of the Datastream universe for the in-sample 
countries.
4
 For developed countries, the number of firms ranges from 32 to 3,625, with an 
average of 496 firms. For emerging markets, the number of firms ranges from 11 to 748, with an 
average of 167 firms. Overall, our sample has an extensive coverage, providing a representative 
sample of the stock markets globally.  
2.2 Shorting Measures  
2.2.1 Definitions 
Markit provides the following raw data items: the number of shares out on loan (or 
borrowed), the number of shares available for lending, the value weighted average lending fee, 
the most recent lending fee (for the last 1-day, 3-day, 7-day, and 30-day periods), the highest and 
                                                          
4
 Our “in-sample countries,” includes all the countries for which Markit provides at least one year of coverage for at 
least one firm at a given time in some dimension, be it lending supply, borrowing demand, or lending costs. 
Effectively, we include all the countries for which Markit has at least some data coverage of common equities. The 
lending fees, as the value-weighted average lending fee income for the lender, can generally be considered as the 
lower bound proxy for the short selling costs. 
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lowest lending fees based on all currently outstanding loans, and the utilization ratio (percentage 
of available shares out on loan over the shares available). To predict future returns, we compute 
seven shorting measures based on these data. Given the potential noisiness in the daily data and 
with an aim of addressing the missing-data issues, we calculate the short-sale measures based on 
loan contracts over the previous five days.  
We consider three types of shorting measures: trade-based, cost-based, and demand/supply-
based measures. Our trade-based measures are short interest ratio (SIR) and day-to-cover ratio 
(DTCR). Since the primary reason for stock borrowing is short selling, we consider the number 
of stock borrowed as a proxy for short interest, and calculate SIR as the average of the number of 
shares borrowed over the previous five days relative to the total number of shares outstanding. 
This is consistent with the literature (Dechow et al. 2001; Desai et al. 2002; Asquith et al. 2005; 
Boehmer et al. 2010). The second shorting measure, DTCR, is computed as the average of the 
number of shares borrowed during the previous five-day period relative to the average daily 
trading volume. Compared to SIR, DTCR is scaled by daily volume rather than the shares 
outstanding; thus, it is a more dynamic measure. The DTCR measure is adopted in Boehmer, 
Jones, and Zhang (2008), Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009a, 2009b), and Boehmer and Wu 
(2013). According to Hong et al. (2016), the DTCR dominates SIR as a measure of shorting 
activity, but the predictions for these two trade-based measures are similar: stocks with either 
high SIR or DTCR are expected to earn negative future returns if short sellers have private 
information and can identify overvalued stocks.  
 The next three cost-based shorting measures are derived from lending fees, which are reported 
as annualized fees in basis points. Markit includes both traditional overnight loans and term 
loans with fixed fees as well. Following Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011), we computed value-
weighted average fees for each stock each day, defined as follows: 
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           measures the daily value-weighted average fee for stock i on day t based on all 
outstanding contracts, where the market capitalization of the n-th contract size, 
                   , is used for weighting. Value weighting reduces the influence of small 
(and presumably expensive) transactions. The                  is the fee on the n-th borrowing 
contract in stock i at the time t, and it is considered as either the fee for non-cash contracts or the 
general collateral rate minus the rebate rate.         includes all the outstanding contracts, and 
thus combines information from both old and new contracts.  
Although overnight contracts are common in the U.S. and in Europe, lenders use term loans in 
other countries. To create a more dynamic measure that captures the lending fees in the most 
recent contracts, we compute a current-fee measure based on contracts that are opened during the 
previous five days. We first define  
            ∑[
               ̂    
∑                ̂    
    
   
            ̂    ]
 ̂   
 ̂  
  
as the value-weighted fee on the  ̂ new contracts that have been opened during the previous five 
days. As many stocks do not have new contracts opened every day, our current fee measure is 
the average of the Currfees measures during the previous five days. In general, the Allfees and 
Currfees measures are highly correlated because fees are revised overnight unless the term 
lending contracts are used for securities lending. As reported by D’Avolio (2002), one concern is 
that the lending fees vary significantly across stocks with market capitalization and institutional 
ownership and can be high for small stocks with high shorting demand. To address this potential 
positive skewness in the lending fees, we transform both measures (Allfees and Currfees) by 
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computing the natural logarithm of one plus the fee variables. Weuse the reciprocals of these 
measures denoted  as 1/Logallfees and 1/Logcurrfees.  
Both fee measures capture the direct cost of shorting. In prior short-sale studies, such as 
Jones and Lamont (2002), D’Avolio (2002), and Evans, Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2009), high 
shorting costs are associated with negative information from short sellers. High fees are driven 
by either high shorting demand in the presence of high frictions or by high demand with low 
supply. Thus, higher fees are expected, ex-ante, to capture higher borrowing demand, more 
negative information from informed short sellers, and high negative returns. In case of our study, 
after the log and reciprocal transformation, the 1/Logallfees and 1/Logcurrfees are expected to 
predict future positive returns.  
We construct another short-sale measure, Feespread, as the average difference between the 
highest and lowest annualized fees on all the outstanding borrowing contracts during the 
previous five days. This variable captures the uncertainty about short-sale costs and possibly 
leads to greater disagreement among equity lenders and borrowers. Both the aspects should 
increase short selling costs and, therefore, the information content. As a result, greater fee 
spreads should increase the predictive ability of short sellers. To address the skewness of the fee 
measures, we used the natural logarithm of the fee spread (but, for simplicity, we retained the 
variable name, Feespread, in the regressions).  
 The remaining shorting variables are demand/supply-based measures. Following Saffi and 
Sigurdsson (2011) and Aggarwal, Saffi, and Sturgess (2015), we define Supply as the average 
percentage of shares available for borrowings during the previous five days. Sufficient lending 
supply is needed to facilitate efficient pricing. If supply is low, then the stock is more likely to 
have binding short-sale constraints, which would increase shorting costs and the return 
predictability of short sales. Similarly, as in Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011), the utilization ratio 
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(Utilization) represents the average number of shares lent out as a fraction of shares available for 
lending during the previous five days. High Utilization generally associated with high shorting 
demand, capturing concentrated interest from a group of short sellers, when Utilization is high. 
Therefore, we expect high utilization rates to be associated with lower future returns.  
 In addition to Supply and Utilization, we also adopt four stock lending market variables from 
Cohen et al. (2007) to capture market dynamics. For each stock, each day, we identify whether 
the stock experiences inward or outward shifts in supply or demand in the stock lending market, 
based on changes in lending fees and the loan amount of all contracts in the lending market. 
Stocks with demand inward shifts (DIN=1) experience a decrease in both the lending fees and 
the loan amount. Stocks with demand outward shifts (DOUT=1) experience an increase in both 
the lending fees and loan amount. For supply shocks, stocks were identified as having supply 
outward shifts (SOUT=1) if the lending fee decreased and the loan quantity increased. Stocks are 
identified as having supply inward shifts (SIN=1) if the lending fee increased and the loan 
quantity decreased.  
 How would the supply and demand shocks affect future returns? Shorting becomes more 
difficult and expensive when supply decreases and demand increases, which indicates that short 
sellers anticipate negative news about the firm, and therefore such changes are expected to 
predict lower future returns and vice versa. Cohen et al. (2007) find that an increase in shorting 
demand, captured by DOUT, is associated with about 3% negative monthly abnormal returns.  
2.2.2 Summary Statistics of the Shorting Measures  
In Table 1 of Panel B, we report the summary statistics for the shorting variables. We present 
the time-series average of the cross-sectional medians country wise. As we have one of the most 
comprehensive datasets of shorting measures in the global market, we discuss the associated 
summary statistics in detail. The average SIR is 1.90% for the U.S., which is comparable to the 
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results of earlier studies in the U.S. setting, such as Boehmer et al. (2010). The second and third 
highest average SIR, 0.75% and 0.32%, are reported for the Netherlands and Spain, respectively. 
The high shorting activity in Spain is possibly driven by the Euro debt crisis. Shorting is 
concentrated in a handful of stocks in many small (e.g., New Zealand) and less developed 
(China, Indonesia, and Malaysia) markets either because only a handful of stocks are actively 
traded or because regulatory restrictions limit shorting to a few stocks. As a result, the time series 
average of the daily median SIR is zero or close to zero in a number of countries. 
The average natural logarithms of the reported fee-level measures, Allfees and Currfees, are 
consistently around 4–5 basis points (bps) for most countries. In terms of the heterogeneity of 
fees, the fee spread is the lowest in Malaysia and Indonesia, where it is around 2 bps. For the 
U.S., South Korea, South Africa, Canada, Singapore, Switzerland, and Taiwan the spreads are 
around 100 bps. The low spread could be the result of either an active and competitive lending 
market, as in the U.S., or strict regulations, which restricts shorting to a few stocks, as in some 
Asian countries. For the remaining countries, the fee spreads are mostly below 400 bps.
5
 As the 
data coverage on fees in China is limited, with less than five firms with fee information in our 
matched sample, we do not report summary statistics on fee variables for China. 
For loan supply, only the following five countries have an average value greater than 5%: 
Canada, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S. This is consistent with limited short 
selling in most countries. The highest loan supply of 17.72% is in the U.S. market, where high 
institutional ownership and active institutional trading support large-scale short selling. The 
utilization ratio is the highest in the U.S., Spain, and Portugal. We expect that the high utilization 
rates are driven by the debt crisis in Spain and Portugal, whereas they are driven partly by the 
                                                          
5
 Lending fees are relatively low for the majority of large and liquid stocks (see D’Avolio, 2002). In markets, where 
shorting is directly or indirectly limited to major stocks such as index constituents, we do not have fee 
observations on the small and less frequently traded stocks. In these cases, fee spread can be relatively low. 
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financial crisis or by the active trading of arbitrageurs in the U.S. For the other countries, the 
utilization ratio is mostly below 5%. 
The DOUT, DIN, SOUT, and SIN average around 10%. This observation suggests that there is 
a significant activity in the shorting market for about 10% of the observations, in either the 
demand or the supply side of the contracts. As the U.S. market is one of the most active shorting 
markets, we find that the frequency of the shocks in this market is significantly higher than the 
average. In the U.S. sample, the time series average of the median percentage of firms with a 
demand outward shift is 24.89%. The corresponding time-series averages of firms with a demand 
inward shift, supply outward shift, or supply inward shift are 26.63%, 18.59%, and 19.66%, 
respectively. We do not compute the four shock variables for China because fee data are not 
consistently available.  
In Table 1 Panel C, we report the correlations between the 11 shorting variables. As expected, 
the two shorting activity measures, SIR and DTCR, have a high correlation at 51.83% (t-
stat=20.58). Similarly, the two fee measures, Logallfees and Logcurrfees, have a correlation 
coefficient of 83.12% (t-stat=64.82). The correlations between the demand and supply shocks are 
significantly negative by construction, because they sum up to one each day for each firm. 
2.3 Returns and Control Variables  
To examine the future return predictability of short selling over different horizons, we 
compute returns over 5-day, 20-day, 40-day, and 60-day windows. Risk adjustment might not be 
important for shorter horizons, such as the 5-day window, but they are essential for horizons 
longer than 20 days. We adopt the factor model in Hou, Karolyi, and Kho (2011; HKK, 
hereafter), which includes both global and country-specific market factors (MKT), momentum 
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factors (MOM), and cash-flow-to-price factors (CP).
6
 The advantage of the HKK factor model is 
that it incorporates information from both the local and global markets and it captures risks in 
addition to the market factor. To be specific, for firm i at the time t, the HKK model assumes that 
expected returns are determined as follows: 
 (   )          
       (    
      )       
      (    
     )       
       (    
      ) 
      
      (    
     )       
       (   
      )       
      (   
     ). 
The superscripts global and local indicate whether the factors are constructed in the global 
market or the local market. We first construct pricing factors as in HKK (see Appendix A for 
details of the factor construction). Next we compute betas for each factor in every quarter, using 
previous one-quarter daily data with the requirement that there are at least 36 non-missing daily 
observations to estimate historical betas. The risk-adjusted returns are calculated as the 
difference between the raw returns and the model-implied returns for the corresponding period, 
which are products of the historical betas and current factor values.  
 As control variables, we include log market capitalization from previous month (MV), book-
to-market ratio from last fiscal year-end (BM), average turnover from previous month 
(Turnover), percentage of zero return days from previous month (PctZero), idiosyncratic 
volatility obtained using HKK model on previous quarter (IdioVOL), past 1-month returns 
(LagRet1m), and past 6-month cumulative returns (LagRet6m), skipping a month. We use these 
variables to control for known stock return patterns related to size, BM, momentum, idiosyncratic 
volatility, and liquidity. As returns and control variables are commonly used, we report their 
summary statistics in the Appendix B Table 1. The magnitude and the patterns are consistent 
with previous literature.  
                                                          
6
 We also test the robustness of our results (see online Appendix) using the Fama and French global factor-pricing 
model.  
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3. Are Short Sellers Informed in Global Markets? 
We first adopt a panel regression approach across all the countries to answer the question of 
whether shorts are informed globally and thus can predict future stock returns. When we pool 
observations from all countries, we can directly compare our estimates on the informativeness of 
short sales across countries with those in the previous studies. In Section 3.1, we start with 
individual shorting measures’ predictive power over a 20-day horizon. In Section 3.2, we extend 
the analysis to longer horizons to compare the persistence and the time frame of the information 
captured in different short sale measures.  
3.1 Pooled Analyses across Countries: 20-Day Horizon 
We start by estimating a pooled regression across countries and days: 
                                                        ,    (1) 
where the dependent variable,           , is the cumulative raw return or the HKK risk-adjusted 
return on stock i over the window t+1 to t+n, with n taking on the value of 5, 20, 40, or 60 to 
capture 5-, 20-, 40-, or 60-day returns with one day skipping. The independent variable 
               represents one or more of the 11 short-sale measures, observed at day t-1 for 
stock i. We also include an array of firm-level control variables (computed from the previous 
month and thus observable on day t-1): natural logarithm of market capitalization during the past 
month (MV), book-to-market ratio (BM) at the end of the previous fiscal year, idiosyncratic 
return volatility over the past month (IdioVol), past 1-month return (LagRet1m), past 6-month 
returns (LagRet6m), turnover in the previous month (Turnover), and percentage of zero return 
days in the previous month (PctZeros). Except for DIN, DOUT, SIN, and SOUT, we normalize 
all the variables to a mean of zero and a standard deviation one within each country-year pair to 
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facilitate the interpretation of the findings across countries. In addition, to account for potential 
return differences at the country level and at the year level, we include both country and year 
fixed effects. Finally, we compute standard errors using double clustering by firm and year.
7
  
[Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 reports the panel regression results for the 20-day future returns. Panel A includes the 
results with raw returns as dependent variables and Panel B presents the results with HKK risk-
adjusted returns as dependent variables. The 11 shorting variables are listed in the first column 
with their expected sign in the second column. All coefficients on the shorting measures are 
displayed in basis points. Given that all continuous shorting variables are normalized to have 
zero mean and unit volatility, the coefficient represents the magnitude of changes in future 
returns in response to a one standard deviation increase in the respective shorting measures.  
In Table 2, a one standard deviation increase in SIR is associated with a 6.62 bps decrease in 
the future 20-day raw returns, with significant t-statistics of −5.72. Alternatively, a one standard 
deviation increase in DTCR predicts a 24.37 bps drop in the future 20-day raw returns with a t-
statistics of −21.24. Both signs are consistent with the expectation that higher shorting demand 
conveys new negative information from short sellers. We note that DTCR appears to have three 
times the effect on future returns as SIR, based on the coefficient magnitudes for each of the 
return horizons. For the Allfees and Currfees measures, we expect that higher fees would predict 
lower future returns. The expected sign is positive as we use the reciprocals of the fee measures. 
However, the coefficients on the fee measures are statistically insignificant; on the 1/Logallfees, 
it is −0.08, whereas on the 1/Logcurrfees measure it is 0.18. 
All other variables have the expected sign and are significant. For the fee spread measure, we 
expect that higher spreads imply lower future return. We find that an increase of one standard 
                                                          
7
 Alternatively, we compute Newey-West adjusted standard errors. The results are similar and are available on 
request.  
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deviation in Feespread is associated with a 27.76 bps drop in the future 20-day raw returns, with 
t-statistics of −18.26. For the stock lending supply, greater lendable supply indicates less 
negative news expectations from the institutions, because otherwise the institutions would not be 
willing to lend their shares. Thus, higher Supply is expected to predict positive returns. An 
increase of one standard deviation in Supply is associated with a 6.08 bps increase in the future 
20-day raw returns, with t-statistics of 5.72. In the stock lending market, higher utilization 
implies greater shorting demand, and thus more negative news. Consistent with this expectation, 
we find that the coefficient on the Utilization measure is −14.77, with t-statistics of −11.10.  
Next, we review the last four variables that capture demand and supply shocks in the stock 
lending market. We find that when demand shifts inwards (DIN=1) and when supply shifts 
outwards (SOUT=1), the expected signs for future returns become positive; conversely, supply in 
the expected signs become negative when the demand shifts outwards. Table 2 results show 
coefficient estimates of 16.41 and −15.40 for DIN and DOUT, respectively, indicating that an 
inward shift in demand signals positive future returns while an outward shift in demand signals 
negative future returns, as suggested by Cohen et al. (2007). For the supply shocks, SIN and 
SOUT, the coefficients are −29.61 and 24.43 bps, respectively. All coefficients on the shock 
measures have the expected signs with significant t-statistics. The R
2
-s across regressions is 
mostly around 2%, which is quite reasonable given the large dimension of the panel.  
On the right side of Table 2, we present the results for predicting the future 20-day HKK risk-
adjusted returns.
8
 The adaption of risk adjustment brings both costs and benefits. For a 20-day 
horizon, various risks are not negligible and need to be controlled for making the correct 
inference about abnormal returns. However, a potential concern is that because the betas are 
estimated over the previous three months of daily data, it is possible that the estimates are noisy, 
                                                          
8
 We consider an alternative risk model based on Fama-French’s specification. The results are reported in the online 
appendix and qualitatively similar to those using HKK risk adjustment.  
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which would result in noisy risk-adjusted returns. Compared to the results shown in Panel A, the 
risk-adjusted coefficient estimates in Table 2 Panel of B are more volatile, smaller in magnitude, 
and have a lower explanatory power. The reduced explanatory power could result from the 
higher volatility in the HKK risk-adjusted returns. Alternatively, the predictive information 
contained in some of the shorting variables could be related to information in the risk factors 
and/or loadings on these factors. Thus, after risk adjustment, the predictive power of these 
shorting variables diminishes. 
We note that the coefficient on SIR is now 8.02 bps, with t-statistics of 6.59, indicating that an 
increase in SIR actually leads to an increase in future returns, which is contrary to our 
expectation. This finding suggests that more outstanding share loans do not imply more informed 
short selling. The remaining estimates are similar to those in Panel A, except that Utilization and 
DIN are insignificant for the risk-adjusted returns. In Table 2 Panel B, the sign of the coefficient 
on Utilization is also contrary to the expectations; as with the SIR variable, the sign flips. The 
coefficient on DTCR is −15.02 bps, with a t-statistics of −13.10, which is significantly smaller 
than the coefficient shown in the left half of the panel. The coefficients on 1/Logallfees and 
1/Logcurrfees remain insignificant.  
 Concerning the results in Table 2, we find that a majority of the 11 shorting variables can 
significantly predict the future 20-day raw or HKK risk-adjusted returns with the expected signs. 
A comparison of the magnitude of the coefficients estimates reveals that DTCR, Feespread, and 
Supply are economically and statistically the most informative about future returns. As the U.S. 
has the largest market weight in the global capital market and in our sample, there is a concern 
that the U.S. firms could drive our results. Thus, we rerun our analysis in Table 2 with a sample 
that does not include the U.S. firms to test the robustness of our results. The results are presented 
in Appendix B of Table 2 and are similar to those reported in Table 2 in the main text. 
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3.2 Pooled Analyses across Countries at Different Horizons 
In Table 2, our results are based on a 20-day horizon investment window, which is close to a 
calendar month. Could the differences in the predictive powers of the alternative measures be 
related to the investment horizon lengths? Our results could also reflect the time-series properties 
of the short-sale measures. For instance, Supply and Utilization are highly persistent with a daily 
AR(1) coefficient above 90%, whereas the shock variables (DIN, DOUT, SIN, and SOUT) have 
AR(1) coefficients close to zero. For the remaining shorting variables, the AR(1) coefficients are 
mostly around 70–80% at the daily horizon. The faster moving variables may capture short 
sellers’ information faster and therefore have stronger return predictability in the short horizon, 
whereas the more persistent variables could have stronger predictive power over longer horizons.  
[Table 3 about here] 
To understand the relation between predictive power of the shorting variables and investment 
horizon, we re-estimate equation (1) for various horizons between 5 days and 60 days. The 
relevant results are reported in Table 3, with raw returns in Panel A and HKK risk-adjusted 
returns in Panel B. For comparison, we include the results for the 20-day horizon, which are also 
shown in Table 2 as benchmarks. In Table 3 of Panel A, SIR, DTCR, Feespread, Utilization, SIN, 
and SOUT all predict future returns significantly across the four horizons with the expected 
signs, whereas DIN and DOUT have the correct sign and are significant for horizons of 10 days 
or longer. The remaining three measures, 1/Logallfees, 1/Logcurrfees, and Supply, predict future 
returns significantly with expected sign for longer horizons of 40 days and 60 days. 
With the HKK risk-adjusted returns in Table 3 Panel B, DTCR, Feespread, Supply, and SOUT 
all predict future returns significantly across all time horizons with the expected signs. As before, 
SIR consistently has the wrong sign over all the horizons. Utilization also has the wrong sign for 
the 5-day horizon and is insignificant for the other horizons. Although the coefficients of 
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1/Logallfees, 1/Logcurrfees, and the rest of the shock variables (DIN, DOUT, and SIN) have the 
correct signs, not all coefficients are significant.  
We make three key observations based on the results in Table 3. First, most of the 11 
variables predict future returns with the expected sign throughout the four horizons, indicating 
that most of the shorting variables are informative about future returns. Second, in many cases 
coefficients become larger and more precise as the investment horizons become longer. This 
could indicate that short sellers have relevant information about longer-term values, such as firm 
fundamentals, or that the market is relatively inefficient, and thus, the information incorporation 
takes longer than a few days. Third, we find that the predictive power of the fee and supply 
measures are statistically and economically more important for the long term (more than a 
month), whereas DTCR, Feespread, and SOUT are significant across all investment horizons.  
To disentangle the information captured by the alternative shorting measures, we include 
multiple shorting measures simultaneously in the same regression. As some shorting variables 
are highly correlated, we select the measures with consistent predictive power, based on the 
results in Tables 1 and 3. For the two trade-based measures, SIR and DTCR, we retain DTCR and 
drop SIR because SIR performs poorly as a predictor of future returns. For the cost-based 
measures, we retain 1/Logallfees and drop 1/Logcurrfees because the Allfees measure has 
stronger predictive power at a longer horizon. We also retain Feespread because this measure 
captures more dispersion in investors’ opinion, an aspect that is different from the other two fee 
measures. For the supply/demand-based variables, we retain Supply and drop Utilization because 
supply has stronger and more significant predictive power. For the four supply-demand shock 
variables, we retain DOUT and SOUT and drop DIN and SIN for similar reasons. Altogether, we 
select six shorting variables: DTCR, 1/Logallfees, Feespread, Supply, DOUT, and SOUT. These 
21 
 
six variables, representing various aspects of short selling and the stock lending market, will be 
our key variables in later discussions.  
The results from the pooled regression including the six shorting measures are reported in 
Table 3 Panel C. In the top section for predicting raw returns, DTCR, Feespread, Supply, and 
SOUT all have significant coefficients with expected signs across all horizons. In the bottom half 
of Panel C with the HKK risk-adjusted returns, only DTCR and Supply have significant 
coefficients with the expected signs across all horizons. A comparison of the R
2
 values between 
Table 2 Panel C and Table 3 Panels A and B shows that adding additional shorting variables do 
not significantly improve the results, which suggests that the remaining variables carry similar 
information. Overall, the results in Tables 2 and 3 show that DTCR and, to a smaller extent, 
Supply are the strongest and the most robust predictors of future returns.  
 
4. Cross-country Variation in Short Sales’ Return Predictability: Evidence and Channels 
 Prior empirical studies show that many short-sale measures can predict future stock returns, 
but most of these studies focus on developed markets and analyze short sales in the U.S., Europe, 
or Japan. Our sample includes 38 countries, thereby allowing us to provide insights into the 
global informativeness of short selling. In particular, we examine whether and why there are 
differences in the predictive power of short selling across countries. To answer this question, we 
start by documenting cross-country differences in Section 4.1 using country level panel 
regressions and country level long-short portfolios based on the various shorting measures. 
Subsequently, we investigate various channels that may explain the cross-country variation in the 
ability of short sales to predict returns. Specifically, we investigated shorting regulations in 
Section 4.2, and market quality and market development in Section 4.3.  
4.1 Cross-country Differences 
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In Section 3, to establish the overall predictive power of shorting variables in the global 
capital market, we require all the coefficients in equation (1) to be the same across countries. In 
this section, we re-estimate equation (1) for each country to examine whether there are 
significant cross-country differences. The results are reported in Table 4 using six individual 
shorting variables to predict 20-day HKK risk-adjusted returns. Table 4 Panel A reports the 
summary of the coefficients across countries and Panel B reports the individual country 
coefficients. The country level results with raw returns, other shorting measures, and other 
investment horizons are reported in the Appendix B Table 4.  
[Table 4 about here] 
To estimate country-level panel regressions based on daily stock returns, we require for each 
day that there are at least five firms with valid observations in the country. We do not have all 
short-sale measures readily available daily for each country. For instance, DTCR is only 
available for 36 countries because China and Chile have less than five stocks with information 
on non-zero shares borrowed in the Markit database.  
As shown in Table 4 Panel A, DTCR significantly predicts future returns in 16 countries and 
has the right sign in 31 of the 36 countries. We also observe substantial cross-country variation 
in this variable; the estimates for DTCR range from −45.78 bps (Norway) to 40.64 bps 
(Hungary). These results suggest that for a one standard deviation increase in DTCR, the future 
HKK 20-day risk-adjusted return decreases by 45.78 bps in Norway and increases by 40.64 bps 
in Hungary. The other five shorting measures generally have the expected signs, but with 
significant cross-country variation. For instance, 1/Logallfees has the expected positive relation 
with future returns in 21 countries, but only two are significant. For Supply, it is significant and 
with the expected sign in 16 countries and has the expected sign in 25 countries. In parallel, we 
use the portfolio approach to show the predictive power of shorting variables in a cross-country 
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setting. We form long-short portfolios in each country by sorting stocks based on past short-sale 
activity, short-sale costs, and other shorting measures. If shorts possess material information 
about future stock returns, then the long-short strategies should produce significant return 
spreads in the future. To be specific, each day, we sort all the firms within a country based on 
one of the six key shorting variables: DTCR, 1/Logallfees, Feespread, Supply, DOUT, or SOUT. 
The first four shorting variables are continuous. We sort firms into decile portfolios based on 
these variables, and long the decile portfolio with the highest shorting variable values and short 
the decile portfolio with the lowest shorting variable values. We require each day to have at least 
five firms in each portfolio. The remaining two variables, DOUT and SOUT, only take on the 
values of zero or one. We take long positions in stocks with shock variables equal to one and 
short stocks with shock variables equal to zero. We compute value-weighted portfolio raw 
returns and risk-adjusted portfolio returns (alphas) on these long-short portfolios by regressing 
portfolio returns on global and local risk factors constructed following the HKK.  
[Table 5 about here] 
 The portfolio alphas on the long-short strategies based on the six alternative shorting 
measures are reported in Table 5. The first two rows present the value-weighted long-short 
portfolio alphas for all the countries (Global VW) and for all the countries excluding the U.S. 
(NonUS VW), respectively. The portfolio strategy, consisting of longing stocks from the lowest 
DTCR decile and shorting stocks from the highest DTCR decile, is associated with −0.55% 
abnormal returns over a 20-day investment horizon, globally. Excluding the U.S. stocks from the 
sample, the long-short portfolio alpha is very similar—about −0.57% over the 20-day horizon. 
Both estimates are highly significant at the 1% level. For 1/Logallfees, Feespread, Supply, and 
SOUT, risk-adjusted returns have the expected signs and are statistically significant. The only 
exception is the alpha associated with the portfolio strategy, based on DOUT: it has the wrong 
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sign in the global sample while with the exclusion of the U.S. observations the alpha is 
insignificant. We also find substantial variation in the alphas across countries. For example, for 
DTCR, the country level risk-adjusted returns range from −1.93% (Israel) to 0.49% (Austria) and 
alphas of the long-short portfolios formed on Supply range between −1.27% (Israel) to 3.15% 
(Spain).
9
  
In summary, the results in Tables 4 and 5 demonstrate the following: first, most of the 
shorting variables have expected signs and are significant in several countries. With firm level 
and the portfolio analysis, consistently we find that the DTCR and the Supply measures are 
significant with expected signs in the most countries but there is substantial cross-country 
variation. In the subsequent sections, we provide insights on these cross-country variations and 
examine the factors that drive these country level differences.  
4.2 Short-sale Regulations and the Financial Crisis  
 Prior studies show that country level shorting regulation affects market efficiency, which is 
directly linked to the informativeness of short selling. For instance, Bris et al. (2007) find that 
stock markets that restrict short selling are less efficient. Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011) examine 
the relation between weekly price efficiency and short-sale constraints using low lending supply, 
and find that stocks with more binding short-sale constraints have lower price efficiency. In 
contrast, Kolasinski, Reed, and Thornock (2013) showed that the newly imposed regulatory 
constraints on shorting actually enhance the informativeness of short selling. How can these 
seemingly conflicting findings be reconciled? Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) propose that if the 
shorting cost is infinitely low or infinitely high, then short sales are likely to be uninformative. 
When short-sale costs are negligible, both informed and uninformed investors are likely to short, 
and therefore the aggregate shorting with both informed and uninformed short sellers might not 
                                                          
9
 In providing a summary overview of the results, we consider only the significant long-short portfolio alphas. 
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be very informative. However, in the case when the shorting costs are material but not 
prohibitively high, uninformed investors are likely to abstain from shorting and only short sellers 
with profitable information will continue to engage in short selling. In this case, higher shorting 
cost actually improves shorting’s predictive power for future returns. It is consistent with the 
findings of Kolasinski et al. (2013), who show that short-sale regulation by increasing the cost of 
shorting might enhance the information content of short-sale trades. On the other hand, Saffi and 
Sigurdsson (2011) suggest when shorts are too expensive or unfeasible, even informed traders 
abstain from shorting, which in turn can result in lower short-sale volumes and lower market 
efficiency. 
In examining cross-country short-sale regulatory differences, we focus on three types of 
regulations: uptick rules (or, more generally, price tests), naked short-sale bans, and the presence 
of a centralized stock lending market.
10
 The typical price-test rule prevents shorting below a 
certain benchmark price. Usually, the current quote midpoint, the last trade, or current bid price 
are used as benchmarks. Price tests, by forcing short sellers to trade in a way that provides 
liquidity to the market, makes shorting costlier than otherwise. In general, the uptick rule is 
viewed as a mildly restrictive regulation, by imposing a small positive cost on short selling. 
Previous papers, such as Diether, Lee and Warner (2009), find that the removal of the uptick rule 
in 2005 for pilot stocks does not have material impact on returns and volatilities. We define an 
uptick dummy that takes on the value of one for days on which some form of price test takes 
effect in a given country and zero otherwise. 
Our second regulatory measure captures naked short-sale bans, which were broadly adopted 
during the 2008 financial crisis. A naked short-sale ban requires short sellers to borrow (or at 
                                                          
10
 We have two forms of centralized markets for lending. In one form, the exchange regulators directly or indirectly 
manage a regulated stock market for lending (e.g., Japan, Taiwan); the other form refers to a privately managed 
centralized market for lending. An example of this is SecFinex, which provided a centralized lending platform for 
European securities from 2000 to 2010.  
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least locate) shares in advance, thereby introducing additional direct cost for short sellers and 
complicating the timing of short transactions. Our naked short-sale ban dummy takes on the 
value of one for days when the naked short-sale ban is in effect in a specific country. In addition 
to naked short-sale bans, a number of countries also have outright ban on financial stocks, key 
industrial stocks, or all stocks. Previous studies, such as Beber and Pagano (2013)’s work, show 
that the outright shorting bans adversely affect the market quality worldwide. Boehmer et al. 
(2013) also document similar results for the U.S. Compared to the outright bans, the naked short-
sale ban is a less restrictive regulation. In Table 7, we report the effect of the naked short-sale 
ban in relation with the return predictability of our six shorting measures. The empirical results 
with outright bans are quite similar to those reported (available upon request), because most of 
the outright bans only apply to a subset of stocks and the overall impact of the outright ban stays 
similar to those of naked short-sell ban.  
The CCPs, by providing structured lending channels or trustworthy counterparty, can 
potentially alleviate short-sale constraints. On the other hand, some countries, such as Taiwan, 
have a CCP with limited over-the-counter (OTC) lending, where regulators control the total 
shorting volume, and thereby effectively restrict OTC lending and borrowing. By eliminating 
counterparty risk for short sellers, the existence of a CCP reduces the cost of short selling. 
However, the increased transparency or increased regulatory oversight may discourage some 
informed short sellers from participating (Easley et al., 2014).  
[Table 6 about here] 
We present the summary statistics for the regulation variables in Table 6. Ten countries have 
an uptick rule in place throughout the sample period and three countries have an uptick rule for 
some portion of the sample period. For instance, the U.S. lifted the uptick rule in 2007 and re-
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introduced a new form of uptick rule in combination with a circuit breaker in 2010.
11
 The 
majority of the countries implemented naked bans for at least part of the sample. For the CCP 
dummy, half of the countries have some form of active centralized lending market during our 
sample period. We examine the variation in the effect of short-sale regulations on the ability of 
short sellers to predict future returns. To capture this effect, we add in interaction terms to the 
model used in Table 2. Specifically, equation (1) is modified as follows:  
             (            )                                         ,   
(2) 
where the variable DREGC,t is a specific short-sale regulation dummy for country C on day t, 
representing the uptick rule, naked short-sale ban, or existence of a CCP. The coefficient    
represents the overall predictive power of shorts for future returns, and the coefficient    
indicates the additional predictive power of short selling when the regulatory dummy takes on 
the value of one.  
[Table 7 about here] 
We present the regression results in Table 7, where Panel A uses future 20-day HKK risk-
adjusted returns and Panel B uses future 60-day HKK risk-adjusted returns. Given the richness of 
our dataset, our empirical results have many dimensions. To facilitate the interpretation of our 
key results, we focus our discussion on the two most robust shorting measures: the DTCR and 
the loan Supply. 
We start with the uptick rule. For DTCR, when the uptick rule is not in place, a one standard 
deviation increase in DTCR is associated with a 12.13 bps decrease in the 20-day risk-adjusted 
returns. In comparison, when the uptick rule is in place, a one standard deviation increase in 
                                                          
11
 A revised uptick rule implemented on February 24, 2010, imposed a halt on short selling for stocks that 
experience 10% price decline in a day. This rule allowed existing shareholders to sell their shares before any new 
short selling. This less restrictive uptick rule was applicable only during the last five months of our sample period 
and was not considered as an uptick rule in the current analyses.  
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DTCR is associated with a (− 12.13 − 5.02) = − 17.15 bps decrease in the 20-day HKK risk-
adjusted returns. For Supply, without the uptick rule, a one standard deviation increase in Supply 
is associated with a 34.42 bps increase in the 20-day risk-adjusted returns. With the uptick rule, a 
one standard deviation increase in Supply is associated with a (34.42 − 28.03) = 6.39 bps 
increase in the 20-day HKK risk-adjusted returns. That is to say, in the case of Supply, the 
presence of the uptick rule reduces the return predictability of the Supply measure. For the other 
measures, the uptick rule improves the predictive power of Feespread and SOUT, but reduces or 
even overturns the predictive power of 1/Logallfees and DOUT. 
Next, we examine how the naked short-sale ban influences the return predictability of short 
selling. Without the naked ban, all short-sale measures predict future 20-day risk-adjusted returns 
significantly with the expected signs. Similar to our findings with the uptick rule, the predictive 
power of DTCR, Feespread, and SOUT increases when the naked ban is present, but the 
predictive power for 1/Logallfees, Supply and DOUT decreases.  
How should we understand the mixed results above regarding uptick rule and naked short-sell 
ban? As mentioned earlier, the less informed traders might choose to exit the shorting market 
when mild regulation (such as the uptick rules and naked short-sale ban) slightly increases the 
cost of short selling, which makes their shorts a likely loss, given that these trades did not convey 
material information to the market. The decline in uninformed short selling increases the 
predictive power of short activities as measured by DTCR. On the other hand, the decline in 
uninformed short selling make it more costly for the supply side to provide loanable shares, and 
therefore it reduces the predictive power of loan Supply. 
Surprisingly, we find that a CCP does not significantly enhance the return predictability of 
any of the short-sale measures. Instead, the predictive powers of the two measures, the 
Feespread and DOUT, are reversed. There are two potential explanations. First, the CCP, by 
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reducing the entry barriers and the difficulty to locate shares and execute short sales, likely 
allows less informed traders to participate, and thereby dilutes the value of information provided 
by the informed traders. Second, the informed short-sellers and loan providers might also avoid 
to trade because the regulators have direct controls over short selling.  
 The recent financial crisis profoundly affected investors and regulators’ attitude towards 
trading, especially to shorting selling. For this reason, we also examine the effect of the 2008 
financial crisis on the informativeness of short selling. During the non-crisis periods, DTCR, 
1/Logallfees, Feespread, Supply, and DOUT all have statistically significance signs in the 
expected directions. The crisis dummy does not alter the overall pattern for DTCR and 
1/Logallfees, and it significantly increases the predictive power of Supply. Meanwhile, it 
significantly reverses the signs of the coefficients for Feespread, DOUT, and SOUT.  
The results with the 60-day HKK risk-adjusted returns are quite similar. It is interesting to 
note that uptick rules and naked bans increase the predictive power of DTCR, whereas they 
decrease the predictive power of Supply. Surprisingly, the existence of CCP seems to have an 
adverse effect primarily on the predictive power of short selling. We draw two inferences from 
Table 7. First, none of the shorting regulations uniformly increases the predictive power of all 
the shorting variables. That is to say, regulatory changes have multi-dimensional impacts on 
various shorting channels and the policy makers need to consider all the factors in. Second, from 
the perspective of shorting activities, measured by day-to-cover ratio, the mild regulations, such 
as uptick rule and naked short-sell ban improve on the predictive power of shorts on future stock 
returns.  
4.3 Market Quality and Market Development  
 Stock market quality, in terms of transaction costs and liquidity, affects the profitability of all 
the trading strategies. As transaction costs decline or liquidity improves, the profitability of a 
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given trading strategy, whether arbitrage or otherwise, increases directly. Thus, we expect more 
shorting and potentially stronger return predictability of short selling. Meanwhile, Bailey, 
Karolyi, and Salva (2006) suggest that the degree of informed trading and market efficiency are 
related to market development when market development is measured by trade openness, GDP 
per capita, and investor protection. As we discussed earlier, good quality of financial information 
may be necessary for short sellers to collect information for their trading strategies. Therefore, 
we expect that countries with higher levels of market development would encourage more 
informed short selling. 
 One empirical challenge here is that market quality and market development may measure 
related concepts. In particular, countries with better market quality are likely to be more 
developed countries with a higher degree of market development. To disentangle the effects of 
market quality and market development, we rely on a range of well-established variables to 
create separate indices for market quality and market development. We construct a daily market 
quality rank index based on three daily market quality measures: the cross-sectional median 
relative bid-ask spread (BAs), the daily median of stock turnover (Turnover), and the daily 
median of zero-return days (PctZero). We first collect information for all the three measures at 
firm level each day and compute the country level medians in the cross section for each day. 
Next, we group countries into quintiles daily where countries from the lowest quintile are 
assigned the value of one for that measure, while countries from the highest quintile are assigned 
a value of five. Subsequently, we sum the quintile ranks of each of the three market quality 
variables daily for each country. Thus, the highest possible raw index value for market quality is 
15. To facilitate interpretation, we scaled the raw index by multiplying it by 10/15 and rounding 
it to the nearest integer. As a result, the market quality index at a given time is an integer from 1 
to 10 for each country, where 1 is the lowest and 10 has the highest market quality value.  
31 
 
 For the market development rank index, we follow a similar approach using the annual GDP 
per capita in USD (GDPPC), protection of individuals’ legal right (LegalRight), and the stock 
market capitalization relative to the country’s total GDP (Stock/GDP).12 Both the GDPPC and 
LegalRight measures are obtained from the World Bank, which does not cover Taiwan. 
Therefore, the index value for Taiwan is missing. The market development rank index also 
ranges from 1 to 10, where 1 represents the lowest and 10 represents the highest level of market 
development. 
[Table 8 about here] 
 Table 8 presents the time-series average of the market quality index and market development 
index for each country. The U.S., Turkey, and China have the highest rankings on the market 
quality index. It is not surprising to find that the U.S. has the highest liquidity and lowest trading 
costs. However, it is surprising to find that China and Turkey are among those countries with the 
highest market quality. These rankings may be due to low bid-ask spreads and high turnover of 
smaller-cap stocks, reflecting large retail investor participation. Russia and Hungary have the 
lowest market quality because in these countries trading is heavily concentrated in a handful of 
stocks. According to the time series average, the U.S., Australia, and Singapore have the highest 
ranking on the market development index, whereas Turkey, Brazil, and Indonesia have the 
lowest values. 
 Next, we examine how market quality and market development influence the return 
predictability of short sales. To facilitate interpretation, we use dummy variables rather than the 
rank index itself. The market quality dummy variable, DMQ, takes on the value of one for days 
for a specific country when the daily market quality index is above five, and zero otherwise. 
Similarly, the market development dummy variable, DEV, takes on the value of one for a country 
                                                          
12
 We also consider alternative country development measures as in Karolyi (2015). The results, reported in the 
Appendix, are similar to those reported in the text.  
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for a specific year when the development index is above five. We follow the same empirical 
specification as in equation (2) and estimate a panel regression augmented by the respective 
interaction terms: 
             (                    )                 
                           
(3) 
where        and        are the dummy variables for market quality and market development 
for country C at day t, respectively. 
[Table 9 about here] 
 In Table 9 Panel A, we present the panel regression coefficients on shorting variables and 
their interactions with the market quality dummy using 20-day and 60-day HKK risk-adjusted 
returns. Again, given the richness of the results, for the sake of brevity we focus our discussion 
on DTCR and Supply. When market quality is low, DTCR and Supply both predict future returns 
significantly and with expected signs. As market quality increases (i.e., the firm goes from below 
to above the median rank), the predictive power of DTCR remains unchanged, yet the predictive 
power of Supply become slightly lower (still significant with expected sign).  
 Table 9 Panel B reports panel regression coefficients on individual shorting variables and 
their interactions with the market development dummy for 20-day and 60-day HKK risk-adjusted 
returns. With lower market development, both DTCR and Supply can predict future returns 
significantly and with expected signs. Higher market development has no significant impact on 
the predictive power of DTCR, but it significantly increases the predictive power of Supply. 
 Finally, we examine how the predictive power of various shorting variables plays out with 
different scenarios of market quality and market development. Therefore, in Table 9 Panel C, we 
separate all the countries into four groups based on the values of DMQ and DEV, and examine 
the predictive power of the shorting variables in each group. The variable DTCR maintains its 
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sign and significance consistently across all scenarios, and the differences across different 
scenarios are not statistically significant. For the Supply measure, it is also significant in all 
cases, but its predictive power is statistically higher with higher market development.  
 For the other measures, 1/Logallfees, the fee level works best when the country has both high 
market quality and high market development. The predictive power of Feespread is the strongest 
when the country has high market quality and high market development, concurrently. The 
demand shock, DOUT, is mostly with the expected negative signs, with larger and more 
significant coefficients with low market development. Finally, the supply shock, SOUT, is only 
significant when both market quality and market developments are high. When market 
development is low, the supply shock actually predicts returns in the opposite way.  
 To summarize, high market quality and high market development generally improves the 
predictive power of some shorting measures, but it is not uniformly true for all the measures. It is 
interesting to find parallel results to these in Section 4.2, that is, the impact of market quality and 
market development is also complex and mixed rather than uniform. Specifically, market 
conditions such as high market quality and high market development improve the predictive 
power of Feespread, Supply, and SOUT. On the other hand, lower market quality and market 
development strengthen the return predictability of the demand measures, DTCR and DOUT. 
Thus, the demand-driven trade-based and stock lending market measures, which capture realized 
short-sale trades, are able to convey information even in less developed market conditions. It is 
because these trades are already the outcome of the interaction between the short-sale constraints 
and arbitrage information, thus the information conveyed is expected to be more robust. High 
levels of market development with good market liquidity may be necessary to incorporate 
information from the stock lending market supply conditions and from the dispersion of 
investors’ opinion.  
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5. Conclusion 
 To provide a global view about short sales’ ability to predict returns, we adopt 11 short-sale 
variables from the existing short-sale literature and group them into trade-based, cost-based, and 
demand/supply-based categories. To investigate whether shorts are informed in the global capital 
markets, we examine whether these variables can predict returns in 38 countries from July 2006 
to December 2014. Most of our shorting variables are remarkably powerful across countries, 
regardless of market quality, short-sale regulation, and degrees of market development. The 
days-to-cover ratio and the loan supply, the former being a trade-based short sale measure and 
the latter a demand/supply-based measure, are the most robust return predictors. Long-short 
portfolios formed based on these shorting measures reveal significant alphas globally and 
significant country-specific alphas for at least one-third of our sample countries. 
 We provide the first empirical analysis to explain the effect of different regulations, market 
quality, and market development on short sellers’ price discovery role. Although short sellers are 
informed traders who help to make markets more efficient globally, it is intriguing to find that 
the return predictability, and thus, short sellers’ reward to arbitrage, varies substantially across 
countries. Mild short-sale regulations, such as uptick rules and naked bans, generally strengthen 
the trade-based measures’ return predictability but weaken the return predictability of the stock 
lending market measures. Concerning market quality and market development, while the trade-
based measure is relatively unaffected, market development seems to be essential for most of the 
fee-based and demand/supply-based measures. Specifically, the spread in fees, loan supply, and 
outward shift in supply predict returns in the expected direction only in the presence of high 
market development. Overall, our results call for caution on how regulations, mild or extreme, 
can potentially affect the functioning of the stock lending market and the price discovery role of 
short sellers.   
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Table 1. Data Coverage and Summary Statistics 
This table provides an overview of the data coverage by Markit Database in Panel A, summary statistics of 11 
shorting variables in Panel B, and correlations of the shorting variables in Panel C. In Panel A, we first report time-
series averages of the daily aggregate market capitalization, percentage of market coverage, and number of days and 
average number of firms by country. Panel B reports the time-series averages of the daily within country cross-
sectional medians of 11 shorting measures. SIR is the average percentage of the number of shares out on loan 
divided by the number of shares outstanding during the previous five days. DTCR is the average number of shares 
on loan relative to the average daily trading volume during the previous five days. Logallfees is the natural logarithm 
of one plus the average annualized lending fee (in basis points) based on all outstanding contracts. Logcurrfees is the 
natural logarithm of one plus the average annualized lending fee (in basis points) based on newly opened contracts 
in the previous five days. Feespread is the natural logarithm of the average daily difference between the highest and 
the lowest fee during the previous five days. Variable Supply is the average percentage of the total number of shares 
available for borrowing during the previous five days. The utilization ratio, Utilization, is the average percentage of 
the number of shares lent out relative to the number of shares available for lending during the previous five days. 
We construct four demand-supply shock variables, DIN, DOUT, SIN, and SOUT, based on the change in the lending 
fees and the change in the loan quantity, following Cohen et al. (2007). The demand outward shift dummy variable, 
DOUT, takes on the value of one for stocks, which experience an increase in both lending fees and loan amounts. 
The demand inward shift dummy, DIN, takes on the value of one for stocks, which experience a decrease in both 
lending fees and loan amounts. The supply outward shift dummy, SOUT, takes on the value of one for stocks, which 
experience a decline in lending fee and increase in loan amounts. Last, the supply inwards shift dummy, SIN, takes 
on the value of one for stocks, which experience a decline in loan amount and an increase in loan fees. Panel C 
reports the correlation coefficients for the key shorting measures and the summary statistics of the correlations 
across countries, which are computed in a pooled sample across firms and time. 
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Panel A. Data Coverage  
Country Market Cap ($ billion) 
Datastream Market Cap 
Coverage 
N(Firms) N(days) 
Australia 1,097 87.72% 641 2,153 
Austria 122 90.97% 58 2,107 
Belgium 261 86.62% 98 2,176 
Canada 1,259 84.93% 631 2,133 
Denmark 137 59.92% 94 2,125 
Finland 201 96.51% 99 2,136 
France 1,901 89.92% 412 2,176 
Germany 1,301 88.44% 399 2,160 
Hong Kong 1,563 89.09% 614 2,099 
Ireland 74 79.08% 32 2,158 
Israel 133 82.50% 97 2,086 
Italy 543 84.37% 209 2,155 
Japan 3,885 99.01% 2,333 2,085 
Netherlands 553 85.28% 78 2,176 
New Zealand 38 66.07% 59 2,140 
Norway 267 91.49% 138 2,136 
Portugal 80 90.74% 33 2,176 
Singapore 471 94.86% 306 2,137 
Spain 609 84.12% 112 2,168 
Sweden 410 78.55% 225 2,136 
Switzerland 1,111 88.12% 222 2,135 
U.K. 2,445 74.96% 893 2,149 
U.S. 14,703 95.05% 3,625 2,139 
Brazil 413 65.26% 89 2,101 
Chile 160 4.27% 35 2,116 
China 1,177 48.31% 190 2,068 
Greece 68 64.92% 73 2,120 
Hungary 23 84.69% 11 2,119 
Indonesia 173 62.32% 67 2,071 
Korea 887 89.29% 748 2,109 
Malaysia 308 86.03% 204 2,097 
Mexico 288 79.07% 70 2,137 
Philippines 106 73.58% 47 2,074 
Poland 139 84.02% 105 2,127 
Russia 709 79.97% 77 2,109 
South Africa 381 87.08% 137 2,126 
Taiwan 642 93.83% 536 2,102 
Turkey 204 86.54% 120 2,138 
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Panel B. Summary Statistics of 11 Shorting Measures by Country 
Country SIR DTCR Logallfees Logcurrfees Feespread Supply Utilization DIN DOUT SIN SOUT 
Australia 0.07 1.25 4.63 4.32 191.75 2.49 1.08 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Austria 0.19 4.29 3.86 4.15 253.20 2.27 3.35 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.15 
Belgium 0.06 1.83 4.23 4.30 247.83 2.16 1.65 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 
Canada 0.26 2.44 3.73 4.00 124.46 5.81 2.37 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.15 
Denmark 0.03 0.83 4.87 4.87 258.53 1.66 1.26 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.12 
Finland 0.14 1.94 4.40 4.57 339.29 3.77 3.23 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.14 
France 0.08 1.60 4.29 4.31 280.63 1.17 2.33 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.12 
Germany 0.06 41.15 4.07 4.33 261.29 2.21 1.54 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.13 
Hong Kong 0.01 0.28 4.87 4.84 179.21 1.29 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.13 0.12 
Ireland 0.04 1.04 4.68 4.89 173.19 2.75 0.61 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.10 
Israel 0.01 0.08 5.86 5.70 165.54 0.35 0.96 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08 
Italy 0.22 1.71 5.02 5.08 290.08 1.67 3.32 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.12 
Japan 0.29 1.18 4.07 4.17 183.45 2.26 3.27 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.12 
Netherlands 0.75 2.85 3.55 3.89 254.61 7.01 5.82 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.16 
New Zealand 0.01 0.59 5.08 5.12 150.20 0.81 0.38 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08 
Norway 0.09 1.72 5.01 5.06 306.96 1.61 3.65 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.12 
Portugal 0.17 1.91 4.72 4.77 384.25 1.57 6.61 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.13 
Singapore 0.00 0.29 5.19 4.93 136.80 0.92 0.05 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.09 
Spain 0.32 2.12 5.24 5.19 429.56 2.35 11.45 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.12 
Sweden 0.08 1.07 4.74 4.82 245.30 2.76 3.10 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.13 
Switzerland 0.19 3.22 3.76 3.99 155.05 5.47 2.44 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.14 
U.K. 0.10 2.03 3.97 4.51 308.80 7.83 0.68 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.14 
U.S. 1.90 3.36 2.45 2.57 107.11 17.72 9.39 0.27 0.25 0.20 0.19 
Brazil 0.02 0.07 5.87 5.89 99.69 0.53 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 
Chile 0.00 0.00 5.17 4.44 77.36 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
China 0.00 0.00    0.16 0.00     
Greece 0.00 0.00 6.02 6.08 143.40 0.30 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.06 
Hungary 0.02 0.70 4.48 4.16 75.77 1.53 1.11 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.11 
Indonesia 0.00 0.00 5.41 5.28 2.13 0.24 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Korea 0.09 0.17 5.71 5.62 112.89 0.47 0.39 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 
Malaysia 0.00 0.00 5.97 5.89 1.25 0.26 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Mexico 0.07 1.28 4.96 5.02 240.52 2.00 2.44 0.19 0.15 0.14 0.12 
Philippines 0.00 0.00 4.59 4.96 12.93 0.42 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Poland 0.00 0.00 5.73 5.90 127.83 0.61 0.00 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.05 
Russia 0.00 0.00 5.32 5.42 32.58 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 
South Africa 0.06 0.64 3.80 3.87 61.15 2.54 0.09 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.11 
Taiwan 0.14 0.46 5.54 5.41 105.71 0.81 5.90 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Turkey 0.03 0.06 5.97 6.00 202.51 0.86 1.56 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.08 
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Panel C. Correlations of the 11 Shorting Measure 
  SIR DTCR Logallfees Logcurrfees Feespread Supply Utilization DIN DOUT SIN 
DTCR 51.83% 
         
 
[20.58] 
         
Logallfees −3.22% −2.69% 
        
 
[−0.88] [−1.64] 
        
Logcurrfees 2.24% 3.20% 83.12% 
       
 
[0.63] [1.79] [64.82] 
       
Feespread 27.56% 20.58% 25.50% 30.30%   
     
 
[11.55] [16.05] [10.51] [11.07] 
      
Supply 38.59% 21.40% −35.38% −31.52% 7.49% 
     
 
[14.71] [11.21] [−9.34] [−10.04] [3.13] 
     
Utilization 55.57% 46.17% 14.78% 19.93% 29.26% 8.74% 
    
 
[27.72] [19.38] [7.43] [9.06] [13.08] [5.94] 
    
DIN 13.03% 9.02% −11.50% −6.16% 10.41% 13.59% 7.65% 
   
 
[17.07] [13.79] [−10.16] [−8.38] [12.15] [15.09] [11.52] 
   
DOUT 11.94% 5.63% −8.16% −2.70% 7.30% 13.48% 7.00% −14.96% 
  
 
[19.35] [11.55] [−8.07] [−4.23] [7.78] [15.20] [10.61] [−11.56] 
  
SIN 9.57% 5.62% −7.78% −7.51% 7.53% 11.85% 5.33% −14.47% −13.51% 
 
 
[18.79] [11.51] [−7.82] [−10.82] [11.10] [14.84] [10.39] [−12.49] [−12.47] 
 
SOUT 8.29% 3.59% −10.10% −9.52% 5.71% 12.15% 3.48% −13.47% −12.58% −12.21% 
  [14.51] [7.13] [−9.80] [−11.87] [8.92] [15.35] [7.12] [−11.98] [−11.95] [−12.93] 
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Table 2. Pooled Panel Regression Using Shorting Measures to Predict Future 20-Day Returns of All Countries 
The dependent variables are future 20-day raw and 20-day HKK risk-adjusted cumulative returns with 1-day skipping. The independent variables comprise 
various shorting measures (only one at the time) and various firm controls. The firms’ controls include the natural logarithm of the market capitalization value 
(MV) (in millions of USD), book-to-market ratio (BM) from the fiscal year-end, previous 6-month cumulative returns skipping 1-month (LagRet6m), previous 
month cumulative returns (LagRet1m), idiosyncratic volatility estimated using HKK (IdioVOL), average daily turnover from the previous calendar month 
(Turnover), and the percentage of zero return days (PctZeros) based on the previous calendar month. SIR is the average percentage of the number of shares out 
on loan divided by the number of shares outstanding during the previous five days. DTCR is the average number of shares on loan relative to the average daily 
trading volume during the previous five days. 1/Logallfees is the reciprocal of the natural logarithm of one plus the average annualized lending fee (in basis 
points) based on all outstanding contracts and 1/Logcurrfees is the reciprocal of the natural logarithm of one plus the average annualized lending fee (in basis 
points) based on newly the opened contracts in the previous five days. Feespread is the natural logarithm of the average daily difference between the highest and 
the lowest fee during the previous five days. Variable Supply is the average percentage of the total number of shares available for borrowing during the previous 
five days. The utilization ratio, Utilization, is the average percentage of the number of shares lent out relative to the number of shares available for lending during 
the previous five days. We construct four demand-supply shock variables, DIN, DOUT, SIN, and SOUT, based on the change in the lending fees and the change 
in the loan quantity, following Cohen et al. (2007). The demand outward shift dummy variable, DOUT, takes on the value of one for stocks, which experience an 
increase in both lending fees and loan amounts. The demand inward shift dummy, DIN, takes on the value of one for stocks, which experience a decrease in both 
lending fees and loan amounts. The supply outward shift dummy, SOUT, takes on the value of one for stocks, which experience a decline in lending fee and an 
increase in loan amounts. The supply inward shift dummy, SIN, takes on the value one when fee decreases and loan quantity increases. The first seven shorting 
variables are standardized within each country and year. We include country and year fixed-effects and cluster standard errors by firm and year. All the 
coefficient estimates reported in this table are multiplied by 10,000. We also report the regression R-squares (under the heading R2) with coefficient estimates for 
shorting measures.   
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Expected 
 
Y=Future 20-day Raw Return Y=Future 20-day HKK Risk-Adj. Return 
SHORT Sign Coefficient Shorts R2 Shorts R2 
SIR − Estimate −6.62 2.58% 8.02 0.69% 
  
[t-stats] [−5.72] 
 
[6.59] 
 
DTCR − Estimate −24.37 2.51% −15.02 0.52% 
  
[t-stats] [−21.24] 
 
[−13.10] 
 
1/Logallfees + Estimate −0.08 2.31% 0.97 0.40% 
  
[t-stats] [−0.11] 
 
[1.50] 
 
1/Logcurrfees + Estimate 0.18 2.24% 1.23 0.29% 
  
[t-stats] [0.23] 
 
[1.64] 
 
Feespread − Estimate −27.76 2.30% −11.50 0.41% 
  
[t-stats] [−18.26] 
 
[−7.32] 
 
Supply + Estimate 6.08 2.58% 18.69 0.71% 
  
[t-stats] [5.72] 
 
[16.40] 
 
Utilization − Estimate −14.77 2.59% 2.28 0.68% 
  
[t-stats] [−11.10] 
 
[1.66] 
 
DIN + Estimate 16.41 2.28% 2.36 0.39% 
  
[t-stats] [11.29] 
 
[1.70] 
 
DOUT − Estimate −15.40 2.28% −3.28 0.39% 
  
[t-stats] [−10.27] 
 
[−2.29] 
 
SIN − Estimate −29.61 2.28% −4.71 0.39% 
  
[t-stats] [−19.54] 
 
[−3.24] 
 
SOUT + Estimate 24.43 2.28% 8.51 0.39% 
  
 
[t-stats] [15.77]   [5.77]   
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Table 3.  
Pooled Panel Regression Using Alternative Short-sale Measures to Predict Future Returns Over Different Horizons 
This table provides panel regression results of using alternative shorting measures to predict future 5-, 20-, 40- and 60-day raw and HKK risk-adjusted returns. 
The independent variables include various shorting measures and various firm controls. The firms’ controls comprise the natural logarithm of the market 
capitalization value (MV) (in millions of USD), book-to-market ratio (BM) from the fiscal year-end, previous 6-month cumulative returns skipping 1-month 
(LagRet6m), cumulative returns over the previous month (LagRet1m), idiosyncratic volatility estimated using HKK (IdioVOL), average daily turnover from the 
previous calendar month (Turnover), and the percentage of zero return days (PctZeros) based on the previous calendar month. SIR is the average percentage of 
the number of shares out on loan divided by the number of shares outstanding during the previous five days. DTCR is the average number of shares on loan 
relative to the average daily trading volume during the previous five days. 1/Logallfees is the reciprocal of the natural logarithm of one plus the average 
annualized lending fee (in basis points) based on all outstanding contracts, and 1/Logcurrfees is the reciprocal of the natural logarithm of one plus the average 
annualized lending fee (in basis points) based on newly opened contracts in the previous five days. Feespread is the natural logarithm of the average daily 
difference between the highest and the lowest fee during the previous five days. Variable Supply is the average percentage of the total number of shares available 
for borrowing during the previous five days. The utilization ratio, Utilization, is the average percentage of the number of shares lent out relative to the number of 
shares available for lending during the previous five days. We construct four demand-supply shock variables, DIN, DOUT, SIN, and SOUT, based on the change 
in the lending fees and the change in the loan quantity, following Cohen et al. (2007). The demand outward shift dummy variable, DOUT, takes on the value of 
one for stocks, which experience an increase in both lending fees and loan amounts. The demand inward shift dummy, DIN, takes on the value of one for stocks, 
which experience a decrease in both lending fees and loan amounts. The supply outward shift dummy, SOUT, takes on the value of one for stocks, which 
experience a decline in lending fee and increase in loan amounts, while the supply inward shift dummy, SIN, takes on the value one when the fee decreases and 
loan quantity increases. The first seven shorting variables are standardized within each country and year. In the regression analysis, we include country and year 
fixed-effects and cluster standard errors by firm and year. All the coefficient estimates reported in this table are multiplied by 10,000.  In Panels A and B, in each 
regression use only one of the 11 shorting measures at the time. In Panel C, six alternative shorting measures (DTCR, Feespread, 1/Logallfees, Supply, DOUT, 
and SOUT) are used simultaneously. 
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Panel A. Pooled Panel Regression Using Individual Shorting Measures to Predict Future Raw Returns  
 
Expected 
 
Predict 5-day Return Predict 20-day Return Predict 40-day Return Predict 60-day Return 
SHORT Sign Coefficient Shorts R2 Shorts R2 Shorts R2 Shorts R2 
SIR − Estimate −1.98 2.64% −6.62 2.58% −13.63 5.21% −13.03 8.82% 
  
[t-stats] [−3.75] 
 
[−5.72] 
 
[−6.12] 
 
[−3.98] 
 
DTCR − Estimate −6.22 2.66% −24.37 2.51% −43.15 5.07% −48.76 8.61% 
  
[t-stats] [−12.70] 
 
[−21.24] 
 
[−20.52] 
 
[−16.25] 
 
1/Logallfees + Estimate −1.15 2.65% −0.08 2.31% 2.65 4.79% 3.80 8.15% 
  
[t-stats] [−2.88] 
 
[−0.11] 
 
[2.30] 
 
[2.50] 
 
1/Logcurrfees + Estimate 0.06 2.73% 0.18 2.24% 4.86 4.69% 3.65 8.21% 
  
[t-stats] [0.15] 
 
[0.23] 
 
[4.12] 
 
[2.40] 
 
Feespread − Estimate −11.39 2.69% −27.76 2.30% −46.18 4.76% −51.51 8.28% 
  
[t-stats] [−16.42] 
 
[−18.26] 
 
[−16.47] 
 
[−12.82] 
 
Supply + Estimate −0.64 2.64% 6.08 2.58% 13.33 5.21% 22.49 8.83% 
  
[t-stats] [−1.35] 
 
[5.72] 
 
[6.54] 
 
[7.54] 
 
Utilization − Estimate −4.27 2.64% −14.77 2.59% −27.96 5.23% −32.11 8.84% 
  
[t-stats] [−7.13] 
 
[−11.10] 
 
[−11.06] 
 
[−8.69] 
 
DIN + Estimate 0.53 2.67% 16.41 2.28% 20.81 4.73% 12.01 8.28% 
  
[t-stats] [0.71] 
 
[11.29] 
 
[9.35] 
 
[4.20] 
 
DOUT − Estimate −0.13 2.67% −15.40 2.28% −27.55 4.73% −23.67 8.28% 
  
[t-stats] [−0.17] 
 
[−10.27] 
 
[−12.08] 
 
[−8.03] 
 
SIN − Estimate −5.65 2.67% −29.61 2.28% −41.47 4.74% −29.13 8.28% 
  
[t-stats] [−7.30] 
 
[−19.54] 
 
[−17.95] 
 
[−9.71]  
 
SOUT + Estimate 5.29 2.67% 24.43 2.28% 41.03 4.74% 38.34 8.28% 
  
 
[t-stats] [6.80] 
 
[15.77] 
 
[17.22] 
 
[12.46] 
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Panel B. Pooled Panel Regression Using Individual Shorting Measures to Predict Future HKK Risk-Adjusted Returns 
 
Expected 
 
Predict 5-day Return Predict 20-day Return Predict 40-day Return Predict 60-day Return 
SHORT Sign Coefficient Shorts R2 Shorts R2 Shorts R2 Shorts R2 
SIR − Estimate  4.21 0.38% 8.02 0.69% 12.80 1.28% 17.52 1.90% 
  
[t-stats] [7.90] 
 
[6.59] 
 
[5.56] 
 
[5.22] 
 
DTCR − Estimate  −3.40 0.32% −15.02 0.52% −24.67 0.97% −30.18  1.45% 
  
[t-stats] [−6.92] 
 
[−13.10] 
 
[−11.59] 
 
[−9.91] 
 
1/Logallfees + Estimate  0.55 0.26% 0.97 0.40% 2.80 0.76% 3.69 1.15% 
  
[t-stats] [1.64] 
 
[1.50] 
 
[2.69] 
 
[2.52] 
 
1/Logcurrfees + Estimate  0.60 0.20% 1.23 0.29% 3.31 0.55% 2.40 0.85% 
  
[t-stats] [1.66] 
 
[1.64] 
 
[2.86] 
 
[1.52] 
 
Feespread − Estimate  −1.79 0.27% −11.50 0.41% −18.15 0.77% −20.05 1.17% 
  
[t-stats] [−2.57] 
 
[−7.32] 
 
[−6.30] 
 
[−4.84] 
 
Supply + Estimate  3.90 0.38% 18.69 0.71% 33.96 1.31% 47.32 1.93% 
  
[t-stats] [7.86] 
 
[16.40] 
 
[15.60] 
 
[14.85] 
 
Utilization − Estimate  3.63 0.38% 2.28 0.68% 3.64 1.27% 6.76 1.89% 
  
[t-stats] [5.99] 
 
[1.66] 
 
[1.41] 
 
[1.79] 
 
DIN + Estimate  2.86 0.26% 2.36 0.39% 5.75 0.74% 2.24 1.13% 
  
[t-stats] [4.05] 
 
[1.70] 
 
[2.66] 
 
[0.79] 
 
DOUT − Estimate  −2.34 0.26% −3.28 0.39% −6.70 0.74% −2.95 1.13% 
  
[t-stats] [−3.19] 
 
[−2.29] 
 
[−3.04] 
 
[−1.01] 
 
SIN − Estimate  −2.05 0.26% −4.71 0.39% −-6.37 0.74% −2.31 1.13% 
  
[t-stats] [−2.75] 
 
[−3.24] 
 
[−2.83] 
 
[−0.78] 
 
SOUT + Estimate  1.83 0.26% 8.51 0.39% 14.46 0.74% 14.45 1.13% 
    [t-stats] [2.47]    [5.77]   [6.26]   [4.73]   
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Panel C. Pooled Stock Level Panel Regression Using Six Shorting Measures Simultaneously 
     Expected Predict 5-day Return Predict 20-day Return Predict 40-day Return Predict 60-day Return 
 
SHORT Sign Coefficient [t-stats] Coefficient [t-stats] Coefficient [t-stats] Coefficient [t-stats] 
Raw Returns 
 DTCR − −3.45 [−6.52] −20.90 [−17.11] −37.50 [−16.83] −43.90 [−13.81] 
 1/Logallfees + −1.92 [−4.77] −2.13 [−2.94] −0.76 [−0.66] −0.36 [−0.23] 
 Feespread − −10.82 [−14.79] −23.52 [−14.74] −37.96 [−12.96] −41.37 [−9.87] 
 
Supply + 2.37 [4.28] 8.94 [7.27] 17.92 [7.71] 27.67 [8.19] 
 
DOUT − 3.28 [3.67] −4.86 [−2.73] −9.84 [−3.51] −5.71 [−1.54] 
 
SOUT + 7.03 [7.74] 23.61 [12.85] 37.48 [12.85] 36.50 [9.47] 
  R2   2.68%   2.36%   4.85%   8.13%   
HKK Risk-Adjusted Returns 
 DTCR − −4.37 [−8.24] −18.63 [−15.23] −31.60 [−14.04] −40.86 [−12.82] 
 1/Logallfees + 0.00 [0.01] −1.10 [−1.72] −0.38 [−0.37] −0.24 [−0.17] 
 
Feespread − −1.02 [−1.38] −8.15 [−4.99] −12.70 [−4.27] −13.17 [−3.09] 
 
Supply + 4.39 [7.80] 18.33 [14.16] 32.30 [13.26] 45.53 [12.89] 
 
DOUT − −2.05 [−2.38] 0.33 [0.19] −1.36 [−0.50] 2.50 [0.68] 
 
SOUT + 1.06 [1.22] 9.02 [5.13] 13.59 [4.78] 14.66 [3.84] 
  R2   0.25%   0.39%   0.74%   1.09%   
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Table 4. Predicting Future 20-Day Returns: Pooled Regression within Each Country  
This table provides stock level panel regression results by country, with the future 20-day HKK risk-adjusted returns as dependent variables. In each regression, 
the explanatory variables comprise one shorting measure (only one at a time) and various firm controls. The firms’ controls are as follows: the natural logarithm 
of the market capitalization value (MV) (in millions of USD), book-to-market ratio (BM) from the fiscal year-end, previous 6-month cumulative returns skipping 
1-month (LagRet6m), cumulative returns over previous month (LagRet1m), idiosyncratic volatility estimated using HKK (IdioVOL), average daily turnover from 
the previous calendar month (Turnover), and the percentage of zero return days (PctZeros) based on the previous calendar month. The shorting variables include 
four shorting activity variables and two stock lending market shocks variables, such as the DTCR (the average number of shares on loan relative to the average 
daily trading volume during the corresponding five days), 1/Logallfees (the reciprocal of the natural logarithm of one plus the average annualized lending fee in 
basis points based on all outstanding contracts), Feespread (the natural logarithm of the average daily spread between the highest and the lowest fees during the 
previous five days), Supply (the average percentage of the total number of shares available for borrowing during the previous five days), DOUT (demand outward 
shift dummy takes on the value of one when fees and loan quantity increase, as adopted from Cohen et al., 2007), and SOUT (supply outward shift dummy that 
takes on the value of one when fees decline and loan quantity increase, as adopted from adopted from Cohen et al., 2007). Again, all variables (with the 
exception of the two shock dummies) are standardized within each country by year. The regression includes firm fixed effects and clustering of the standard 
errors by year and firm. Panel A reports the summary of pooled panel regression results and Panel B reports panel regression results by country. All coefficient 
estimates reported are multiplied by 10,000. ***, **, * indicates the corresponding significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
 
Panel A. Summary of country level regressions 
Shorts DTCR 1/Logallfees Feespread Supply DOUT SOUT 
Expected sign − + − + − + 
# negative 31 16 22 13 21 15 
# positive 5 21 15 25 16 22 
# negative significant 16 0 7 5 4 3 
# positive significant 0 2 3 16 2 7 
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Panel B. Country Level Coefficients for Six Shorting Measures 
 
DTCR 1/Logallfees Feespread Supply DOUT SOUT 
Expected sign − + − + − + 
Australia −25.48*** 0.35 −10.14 13.84** −3.48 17.00* 
Austria −23.98* 17.59 −6.83 10.33 −32.67* 3.77 
Belgium −37.05*** −1.14 0.90 5.45 −8.69 14.68 
Canada −21.08*** −0.97 10.13 −14.86*** 4.81 −0.57 
Denmark 12.93 −1.89 4.54 59.82*** 17.34 −13.28 
Finland −16.94 5.69 46.15*** 32.63*** −15.91 −30.55** 
France −6.33 0.60 8.20* 41.19*** −2.41 15.78** 
Germany 1.92 4.50 −11.04 47.89*** 20.24** 12.47 
Hong Kong −28.39*** −0.57 −20.54*** −2.80 −17.53** 8.60 
Ireland −25.05 −13.50 26.18 37.41 18.95 31.84 
Israel −17.47 5.83 −1.55 −16.37 −16.88 8.38 
Italy −33.94*** 7.59 −15.19** 33.91*** −14.11 3.73 
Japan −16.91*** 0.14 8.04** −4.33* −1.57 7.56** 
Netherlands −16.96* −3.40 1.49 25.62** 16.67 −2.07 
New Zealand −9.80 −8.31 13.60 −14.99 −6.46 27.15** 
Norway −45.78*** −1.80 −21.29 31.90*** 4.56 0.10 
Portugal −11.04 7.59 9.56 7.63 18.85 −33.81 
Singapore −30.70*** 6.94 −16.33* 9.00 16.41* −19.43* 
Spain −15.75 28.88*** −21.70* 76.66*** −1.21 −32.44** 
Sweden −30.63*** 8.03* 2.37 25.75*** 0.35 30.21*** 
Switzerland −16.11** −1.07 1.39 28.74*** 4.59 11.92 
U.K. −6.50 2.55 15.24*** 54.11*** 3.99 16.76*** 
U.S. −5.63** −0.04 −32.29*** 36.36*** −6.91*** 13.46*** 
Brazil −23.35 11.47 −18.80 2.76 31.19* 35.75* 
Chile 
 
−176.26 231.73 −24.62 262.08*** 353.85*** 
China 
  
 11.59* 
  
Greece −19.35* 40.61 −28.54 2.77 −27.65 −4.29 
Hungary 40.64* 1.23 −12.40 41.78 −33.63 37.79 
Indonesia 4.21 46.97 −43.60 31.24** −133.70 −57.40 
Korea −28.19*** 0.20 −17.42*** −9.05** −14.94** −6.38 
Malaysia −1.93 35.22** −24.55 −2.55 −6.38 0.74 
Mexico −29.11** −9.37 −18.72 −27.08** 14.38 −7.66 
Philippines −9.07 98.10* −102.37*** −20.42 −294.52*** −236.43*** 
Poland −44.78*** 18.51 8.65 −24.36** −28.82 −12.62 
Russia 14.02 −14.87 −36.20 61.35** −19.90 12.97 
South Africa −13.57* −0.39 −27.71*** 18.48** −2.34 3.54 
Taiwan −23.46*** −0.33 −12.92** −12.33*** 4.30 −8.44 
Turkey −17.60** −8.49 −13.51 −4.15 4.91 −1.37 
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Table 5. Long-Short Portfolios 
This table reports the portfolio alphas from value-weighted long-short portfolios using 20-day holding period returns 
by country. The long-short portfolios are formed each day by taking long (short) position in stocks with shorting 
activity measures (DTCR, 1/Logallfees, Feespread, and Supply) from the top (bottom) quintile and holding the 
portfolio for 20 days. Concerning the two shorting shock measures, each day we take long positions in stocks with 
DOUT=1 or SOUT=1 and short stocks, which did not experience shocks in the stock lending market. The four 
shorting activity measures and the two shock measures are defined in Table 2. To establish portfolios, we require 
that we have at least five firms in each portfolio within each country. All the returns reported in this table are 
multiplied by 100. ***, **, * indicates the statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. In the regression analysis, we 
adjust for the time-series correlation using NW correction with 20 lags. 
Shorts DTCR 1/Logallfees Feespread Supply DOUT SOUT 
Expected sign − + − + − + 
Global VW −0.55*** 0.83*** −0.52*** 0.49*** 0.03* 0.02 
NonUS VW −0.57*** 0.54*** −0.36*** 0.38*** 0.02 0.05*** 
Australia −1.12*** −0.08 −0.07 0.47 −0.12** 0.17** 
Austria 0.49 5.48*** 
 
−0.23 0.16 0.04 
Belgium −1.33*** 1.05** −0.67 0.10 0.03 −0.14 
Canada −1.31*** 0.14 −0.17 −0.12 −0.10** 0.07 
Denmark −0.62 1.70*** −2.62** 0.49 −0.03 0.20 
Finland −0.99*** 0.08 −0.30 1.10** −0.06 0.27* 
France −0.53* 0.01 −0.25 0.40 0.16** −0.03 
Germany −0.02 1.13*** −1.44*** 1.03*** 0.24** 0.02 
Hong Kong −1.14*** −0.03 −0.72* 0.70** 0.04 0.17* 
Ireland 
    
−0.11 0.09 
Israel −1.93*** 0.15 0.69 −1.27*** 0.11 0.06 
Italy −0.72* −0.22 0.05 0.73** 0.13 0.03 
Japan −0.19 0.43 −0.19 0.26 −0.14*** 0.05 
Netherlands −0.99*** 0.56 −0.24 −0.04 0.12 −0.11 
New Zealand −1.81 6.32*** 
 
−0.49 0.16 0.03 
Norway −1.60*** 0.97* −0.38 0.97** 0.07 0.08 
Portugal 
    
−0.11 −0.29* 
Singapore −0.69** 0.60 0.44 −0.01 0.10 0.06 
Spain −0.18 2.26*** −0.66* 3.15*** 0.24* 0.09 
Sweden −0.08 −0.05 −0.13 0.79 0.10 0.18** 
Switzerland −0.52** 0.70* −0.50* 0.45 0.12 0.11 
U.K. −0.27 0.55 0.02 −0.12 0.11 −0.01 
U.S. −0.53** 1.33*** −0.75** 0.68*** 0.05 −0.03 
Brazil −1.50*** 0.87 −0.19 −0.03 −0.16 −0.09 
China 
   
0.62** 
  
Greece 
   
1.27 0.00 0.52* 
Indonesia 
   
−0.15 
  
Korea −0.42 0.59 −1.09** 0.07 0.06 0.16** 
Malaysia −0.15 0.89* 0.00 0.32 −0.25 −0.19 
Mexico −1.19 0.64 −0.04 −0.55 0.01 0.23** 
Philippines 
   
0.64 
  
Poland −1.11* −0.01 
 
0.21 −0.08 −0.11 
Russia 
   
0.82 −0.45 −0.18 
South Africa −1.03*** 0.38 −0.75** 0.12 0.11 0.01 
Taiwan 0.37 0.85* −0.43 −0.56* −0.06 0.02 
Turkey −0.63 0.62 −0.41 0.32 −0.05 0.06 
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Table 6. Country Short-sale Regulations  
This table provides the summary of short sale regulations of each country during our sample period. The column 
Uptick reports whether some form of price test was in place in a given country during our sample period (with YES 
or NO). If the price tests are not in place for the full sample period, we report the specific time frame when the 
restrictions are in place. The column NakedBan reports the time frame when naked short-sale restrictions are in 
place in a specific country. The column CCP reports whether a centralized lending market or centralized clearing on 
the main stock exchange is available in a given country during the entire sample period or during a specific period. 
 
Country Uptick NakedBan CCP 
Australia No After 2001 No 
Austria No 2008–2010 Yes 
Belgium No 2008–2009, 2011–present Yes 
Canada Before 2012 After 2012  Yes 
Denmark No After 2012  No 
Finland No After 2012  No 
France No After 2008  Yes 
Germany No After 2008  Yes 
Hong Kong Yes Yes No 
Ireland No After 2012 No 
Israel No Yes No 
Italy No 2008–2008, 2008–2009 
2012-present 
No 
Japan Yes After 2008 Yes 
Netherlands No 2008–2009, 2012–present Yes 
New Zealand No No No 
Norway No After 2008  No 
Portugal No After 2008  Yes 
Singapore No Yes Yes 
Spain No Yes No 
Sweden No After 2012 No 
Switzerland No 2008–2009 Yes 
U.K. No After 2012 Yes 
U.S. Before 2007, 2010–present 2008 No 
Brazil No Yes Yes 
Chile Yes Yes No 
China No No No 
Greece Before 2007, 2009–present Yes No 
Hungary No After 2012 No 
Indonesia No No No 
Korea Yes After 2006 No 
Malaysia Yes Yes After 2007 
Mexico Yes Yes Yes 
Philippines Yes Yes No 
Poland No No No 
Russia Yes No No 
South Africa No Yes No 
Taiwan Yes No Yes 
Turkey Yes No No 
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Table 7. The Return Predictability of Short Sales vs. Short-sale Regulations  
This table reports the pooled panel regression results of HKK risk-adjusted returns over 20 and 60 days across all 
countries using one shorting variable and its interaction with regulation dummies or crisis dummies. Dependent 
variable comprises either 20-day or 60-day HKK risk-adjusted returns. Firm level controls are included as 
independent variables. The various independent shorting measures are as follows: DTCR (the average number of 
shares on loan relative to the average daily trading volume during the corresponding five days), 1/Logallfees (the 
reciprocal of the natural logarithm of one plus the average annualized lending fee based on all outstanding contracts, 
Feespread (the natural logarithm of the average daily spread between the highest and the lowest fees during the 
previous five days), Supply (the average percentage of the total number of shares available for borrowing during the 
previous five days), DOUT (demand shock outward dummy), and SOUT (supply shock outward dummy). Stocks 
with DOUT=1 (SOUT=1) had their loan fees and loan amount rise (their loan fee fall and their loan amount rise). 
The regulation dummy (DREG) takes on the value of one when price test, shorting ban, or central clearing (e.g., 
Uptick, NakedBan, and CCP) is in place. The controls and shorting variables used in the regression are standardized 
within each country-year. The pooled stock level regression using the country measures include year fixed effect 
with clustering of the standard errors at the firm and year level. All reported coefficient estimates are multiplied by 
10,000. ***, **, * indicates the corresponding significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.  
 
Panel A. Predicting Future 20-day HKK Risk-adjusted Returns 
    DTCR 1/Logallfees Feespread Supply DOUT SOUT 
 
Expected Sign  − + − + − + 
Uptick DREG=0 −12.13*** 2.89*** −5.79** 34.42*** −18.76*** −3.08 
 
Diff −5.02** −3.09** −9.66*** −28.03*** 25.96*** 18.69*** 
  DREG=1 −17.15*** −0.21 −15.46*** 6.39*** 7.20*** 15.61*** 
NakedBan DREG=0 −8.56*** 1.99** −10.16*** 42.17*** −10.27*** 4.09** 
 
Diff −14.34*** −2.19* −3.12 −51.72*** 16.28*** 8.90*** 
  DREG=1 −22.90*** −0.20 −13.28*** −9.55*** 6.01*** 13.00*** 
CCP DREG=0 −14.99*** 0.90 −23.24*** 24.63*** −8.69*** 8.19*** 
 
Diff −0.17 0.30 25.00*** −12.51*** 12.25*** −0.29 
  DREG=1 −15.17*** 1.19 1.75 12.12*** 3.56 7.90*** 
Crisis DREG=0 −15.29*** 1.16* −17.21*** 12.61*** −10.19*** −2.72* 
 
Diff 1.23 −0.78 34.06*** 36.04*** 43.65*** 61.48*** 
  DREG=1 −14.06*** 0.38 16.85*** 48.65*** 33.46*** 58.76*** 
 
Panel B. Predicting Future 60-day HKK Risk-adjusted Returns 
    DTCR 1/Logallfees Feespread Supply DOUT SOUT 
 
Expected Sign  − + − + − + 
Uptick DREG=0 −20.75*** 9.93*** −9.81* 86.26*** −38.48*** −9.65 
 
Diff −16.16*** −10.23*** −17.34** −69.37*** 59.81*** 39.27*** 
  DREG=1 −36.91*** −0.30 −27.15*** 16.89*** 21.33*** 29.62*** 
NakedBan DREG=0 −9.17** 7.35*** −8.72 115.48*** −14.45*** −2.60 
 
Diff −46.54*** −8.15*** −26.09*** −150.56*** 27.66*** 37.07*** 
  DREG=1 −55.71*** −0.80 −34.81*** −35.09*** 13.20** 34.47*** 
CCP DREG=0 −28.99*** 5.45*** −54.43*** 59.20*** −21.67*** −1.15 
 
Diff −2.73 −3.76 70.67*** −25.00*** 42.03*** 31.58*** 
  DREG=1 −31.72*** 1.69 16.24*** 34.20*** 20.35*** 30.42*** 
Crisis DREG=0 −30.21*** 3.91** −33.67*** 39.27*** −26.51*** −17.97*** 
 
Diff −0.45 −0.89 87.11*** 50.50*** 157.92*** 192.53*** 
  DREG=1 −30.67*** 3.02 53.44*** 89.77*** 131.40*** 174.55*** 
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Table 8. Market Quality and Market Development Index 
We report the time series average of the market quality measures and its corresponding market quality index, and the 
market development measures and its corresponding market development index. The market quality measures 
comprise the cross-sectional daily medians of individual stock relative bid-ask spread (BAs), daily medians of 
individual stock turnovers (Turnover), and the daily medians of zero return days (PctZero). The market 
developments measures comprise the GDP-per-capita in USD (GDPPC), legal rights (LegalRight), and stock market 
capital divided by GPD-per-capita and its result multiplied by the country’s population (Stock/GDP). We construct 
country-level rank indices for both market quality and market development by sorting all countries in quintile 
groups based on each of the market quality or market development measures and adding up the quintile rankings. 
We scale the index ranks to ensure that it stays between 1 and 10. The lower ranks indicate lower market quality 
(market development) and vice versa.  
Country BAs Turnover PctZero 
Market  
Quality 
GDPPC 
(‘000) 
Legal 
Right 
Stock 
/GDP 
Market 
Development 
Australia 5.33% 0.08% 1.73% 5.13 54.6 11 1.34 9.05 
Austria 0.85% 0.07% 1.47% 6.93 48.6 5 0.47 5.94 
Belgium 1.37% 0.05% 1.55% 5.70 45.8 4 0.79 5.99 
Canada 1.79% 0.10% 1.43% 6.49 47.8 9 1.26 9.00 
Denmark 2.05% 0.08% 2.78% 5.82 59.2 8 0.81 8.98 
Finland 1.03% 0.07% 1.00% 6.81 48.5 7 1 7.99 
France 1.62% 0.04% 1.60% 5.24 42.1 4 1.08 6.00 
Germany 3.39% 0.01% 1.11% 3.26 43.9 6 0.54 5.97 
Hong Kong 1.71% 0.09% 20.98% 5.00 34.2 7 7.4 8.01 
Ireland 2.25% 0.08% 1.19% 5.66 53.3 7 0.42 6.42 
Israel 2.78% 0.04% 3.77% 3.78 30.7 6 0.8 6.01 
Italy 1.47% 0.11% 0.99% 7.19 36.7 2 0.51 3.17 
Japan 0.33% 0.19% 28.10% 6.80 40.2 4 0.9 5.91 
Netherlands 0.51% 0.17% 1.34% 8.65 51.4 3 0.99 6.00 
New Zealand 1.96% 0.04% 1.61% 4.77 35.3 12 0.5 6.20 
Norway 1.93% 0.07% 2.76% 5.33 92.9 5 0.79 7.11 
Portugal 1.92% 0.08% 18.76% 4.50 22.4 2 0.55 3.13 
Singapore 2.88% 0.06% 1.41% 4.97 47.2 8 2.26 9.45 
Spain 1.10% 0.15% 1.23% 7.86 31.3 5 0.67 5.90 
Sweden 1.40% 0.09% 3.41% 6.23 54.9 6 1.17 7.88 
Switzerland 0.71% 0.09% 1.02% 7.72 76.5 6 2.36 9.00 
U.K. 4.73% 0.09% 1.30% 5.50 42.3 7 1.68 8.84 
U.S. 0.21% 0.50% 0.00% 9.39 49.8 11 0.99 9.00 
Brazil 1.23% 0.17% 1.21% 8.06 10.2 2 0.35 2.25 
Chile 2.12% 0.03% 53.05% 2.76 12.8 4 17.38 6.00 
China 0.15% 1.34% 6.88% 8.89 5.8 4 0.47 2.79 
Greece 2.57% 0.04% 1.66% 3.61 26 3 0.49 3.22 
Hungary 3.79% 0.06% 58.87% 2.25 13.6 9 0.23 4.99 
Indonesia 1.61% 0.06% 99.63% 5.36 3 4 0.4 2.52 
Korea 0.44% 0.44% 77.69% 6.78 23.3 5 0.9 5.98 
Malaysia 2.24% 0.06% 6.87% 4.50 9 7 1.59 6.74 
Mexico 0.81% 0.08% 3.25% 6.78 9.4 8 0.35 5.20 
Philippines 2.60% 0.04% 20.96% 3.34 2.2 3 0.66 2.45 
Poland 2.14% 0.05% 1.57% 4.99 12.8 7 0.35 4.09 
Russia 13.51% 0.01% 98.45% 1.02 11.5 5 0.59 3.63 
South Africa 2.06% 0.06% 2.39% 6.09 6.7 5 1.5 5.88 
Taiwan 0.33% 0.38% 11.89% 8.17 
   
. 
Turkey 0.67% 0.73% 0.26% 9.13 10 3 0.32 2.07 
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Table 9. The Return Predictability of Short Sales vs. Market Quality and Market Development 
This table reports the pooled panel regression results of HKK risk-adjusted returns over 20 and 60 days across all 
countries using one shorting variable and its interaction with market quality dummies (DMQ) or market 
development dummies (DEV). The dependent variable comprises either of 20-day or 60-day HKK adjusted returns. 
The firm level controls are included as independent variables. The various independent shorting measures are: 
DTCR (the average number of shares on loan relative to the average daily trading volume during the corresponding 
five days), 1/Logallfees (the reciprocal of the natural logarithm of one plus the average annualized lending fee based 
on all outstanding contracts, Feespread (the natural logarithm of the average daily spread between the highest and 
the lowest fees during the previous five days), Supply (the average percentage of the total number of shares available 
for borrowing during the previous five days), DOUT (demand shock outward dummy), and SOUT (supply shock 
outward dummy). Stocks with DOUT=1 (SOUT=1) had their loan fees and loan amount rise (their loan fee fall and 
their loan amount rise). The market quality and market development dummies are based on the market quality and 
the market development indices, defined in Table 8. The dummies take the value of one when the index is above 
five, and zero otherwise. The controls and shorting variables used in the regression are standardized within the 
country-year. The pooled stock level regression using the country measures includes year fixed effects and standard 
errors clustered by the firm and year level. All reported coefficient estimates are multiplied by 10,000. ***, **, * 
indicates the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
  
Panel A. Interaction of Short-sale Measures with Market Quality 
    DTCR 1/Logallfees Feespread Supply DOUT SOUT 
  Expected Sign − + − + − + 
20-day  DMQ=0 −16.68*** 4.89** −0.42 22.75*** −35.59*** −24.14*** 
 
Diff 2.00 −4.40** −13.10*** −5.03** 37.98*** 37.97*** 
  DMQ=1 −14.68*** 0.48 −13.52*** 17.71*** 2.40 13.84*** 
60-day DMQ=0 −26.73*** 7.88 6.29 58.92*** −45.68*** −28.96*** 
 
Diff −4.44 −4.71 −31.39*** −14.62** 50.74*** 50.50*** 
  DMQ=1 −31.17*** 3.17** −25.10*** 44.30*** 5.06 21.54*** 
 
Panel B. Interaction of Short-sale Measures with Market Development 
    DTCR 1/Logallfees Feespread Supply DOUT SOUT 
 
Expected Sign − + − + − + 
20-day  DEV=0 −18.11*** 2.44 −6.77* 6.83*** −15.55*** −14.20*** 
 
Diff 3.48 −1.55 −5.26 13.88*** 13.83*** 24.99*** 
  DEV=1 −14.63*** 0.90 −12.02*** 20.71*** −1.72 10.79*** 
60-day DEV=0 −42.58*** 1.61 −3.65 8.81 −32.76*** −32.25*** 
 
Diff 14.02* 2.35 −18.27* 44.75*** 33.76*** 51.60*** 
  DEV=1 −28.55*** 3.96*** −21.92*** 53.56*** 1.00 19.35*** 
 
Panel C. Interaction of Short-sale Measures with Both Market Quality and Market Development, Concurrently 
    DTCR 1/Logallfees Feespread Supply DOUT SOUT 
  Expected Sign − + − + − + 
20-day DMQ=DEV=0 −19.69*** 6.51** 5.23 10.69*** −50.26*** −49.89*** 
 
DMQ=0, DEV=1 −16.23*** 4.78** −0.82 24.42*** −34.48*** −22.29*** 
 
DMQ=1, DEV=0 −17.71*** 2.06 −8.12** 5.98** −11.69*** −10.53** 
 
DMQ=DEV=1 −14.25*** 0.33 −14.17*** 19.71*** 4.09** 17.06*** 
60-day DMQ=DEV=0 −39.02*** 5.86 25.60** 19.85** −80.18*** −80.93*** 
 
DMQ=0, DEV=1 −25.01*** 8.01 5.02 64.09*** −43.33*** −25.48** 
 
DMQ=1, DEV=0 −43.45*** 1.21 −6.79 6.46 −27.87** −27.47** 
 
DMQ=DEV=1 −29.43*** 3.36** −27.37*** 50.69*** 8.97** 27.97*** 
 
